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Article 7

SENTENCING IN WEST GERMANY
THOMAS WEIGEND*

Foreign observers call America a land of extremes. Although
overbroad in many contexts, that characterization captures the essence
of the American approach to sentencing. In recent years, the American
criminal justice system has experienced a trend away from an individualized, highly discretionary approach toward offense-oriented, non-individualized, determinate sentencing. Criticism of either extreme
suggests the need for finding a possible middle ground between traditional and "new" sentencing. An examination of West Germany's system of shared and controlled sentencing discretion can inform this
search by serving as a paradigmatic "compromise" model.
For almost a century, the sentencing stage of the criminal process
in America commonly was viewed as little more than a negligible interlude between adjudication and corrections.' Once the state convicted
an individual of a criminal offense, so the theory went, it must try to
rehabilitate him and make him into a law-abiding citizen. Early experience with rehabilitative programs made it evident that rehabilitation
takes time, and that the time needed is hard to predict. The sentence
ordered by the judge was perforce tentative and no more than a vague
guidepost on the path toward successful treatment. Because the offender's rehabilitative progress, gauged by scientific expertise, ultimately determined the length of his stay in prison,i initial sentencing
safely could be left to the untrammeled discretion of the trial judge.
Doubts about the wisdom of rehabilitation as the primary goal of
the sentencing process,2 coupled with evidence that rehabilitation programs seldom reduce recidivism rates,3 have undermined the rehabili© 1983 by Thomas Weigend.
* Research Associate, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal
Law, Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany; M.C.L. 1973, University of Chicago; Dr. Jur.
1977, University of Freiburg.
1. See generally Zalman, The Rise and Fallofthe IndeterminateSentence, 24 WAYNE L.

REV. 45 (1977) (describing the legal history of the indeterminate sentence as a rehabilitative
measure).
2. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971);
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Dershowitz, Background Paper, in
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN

PUNISHMENT 67 (1976). StruggleforJustice is discussed infra note 4 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., S. BRODY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SENTENCING (1976); Martinson, What
Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974).
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tative ideal's popularity. The disappearance of a scientific justification
for widely discrepant sentences laid bare the incompatibility of traditional sentencing with the principles of equality, proportionality, humanity, and justice.
In 197 1, the American Friends Service Committee offered an influential alternative concept of "just" sentencing. Their proposal for a
radical about-face in sentencing philosophy, which advocated retribution for a criminal act rather than rehabilitation, set the trend for the
seventies.4 For example, the basic concept of offense-oriented,
nonindividualized, nondiscretionary, determinate sentencing influenced California's Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act.' After the
first surge of enthusiasm, however, the reform movement's theoretical
underpinnings and its legislative manifestations have met with severe
criticism.6 Much of the original attractiveness of determinate sentenc4. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, supra note 2. The study group proposed that
the law should deal only with a narrow aspect of the individual, his criminal act or acts.
The whole person is not the concern of the law. Whenever the law considers the
whole person it is more likely that it considers factors irrelevant to the purpose of delivering punishment. . . . If there are mitigating circumstances society feels should be
considered in administrating the law, these should be spelled out in defining the criminal act and not left unstated to be filled in later by functionaries operating with wide
discretionary powers ...
Id at 147.
5. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1170-1170.7 (West Supp. 1981). See generally Note, Determinate Sentencing in Cal!fornia and Illinois Its Effect on Sentence DisparityandPrisonerRehabilitation, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 551 (explaining how the California and Illinois determinate
sentencing statutes promote uniformity in sentencing and eliminate disparity). A number of
other states introduced similar schemes, generally less strict in sentencing philosophy but
more severe in sentence length. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-08 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1151, 1252 (Supp. 1981); see also Bagley,
Why Illinois Adopted Determinate Sentencing, 62 JUDICATURE 390 (1979) (explaining the
development of the Illinois determinate sentencing statute).
The reform movement also found expression, in some states, in the abolition of parole and the establishment of sentencing commissions. These measures often were accepted
as compromise steps by legislatures reluctant to pass determinate sentencing legislation. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 244, 244.09 (West Supp. 1982) (authorizing the establishment of
determinate sentencing guidelines); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 2151-2155 (Purdon 1981
& Supp. 1982) (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing).
6. See, e.g., Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive PunishmentBefore andAfter Rummel v. Estelle, 1980 DUKE L.J. 1103 (expressing concern that punishment under determinate sentencing is disproportionate to
offender fault and victim harm, and is imposed without sufficient eighth amendment
checks); Orland, Is DeterminateSentencing an Illusory Reform?, 62 JUDICATURE 381 (1979)
(no effect on sentencing disparity); Alper & Weiss, The MandatorySentence.: Recipefor Retribution, 41:4 FED. PROBATION 15 (1977); Cole, Will Definite Sentences Make a Difference?,
61 JUDICATURE 58 (1977) (definite sentencing will have no effect on sentence length, certainty of punishment, or crime control, but will be symbolically valuable as open and fair);
see also Cei, The Indeterminate Sentence at the Crossroads, 3 N. ENG. J. PRISON L. 85 (1975)
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ing, which rested in part on its promise of a fresh start, has faded.
Nonetheless, it is far too early to dismiss determinate sentencing as just
another good try.
The debate has now reached three central questions: Does determinate sentencing rest on sound philosophical and penological theory?
Would "flat sentencing," which removes all discretion from the judge's
decision, be a desirable change?7 Is there a viable middle ground between traditional and "new" sentencing?
This article considers the third question by describing German
sentencing. The weaknesses and deformities that the German system
suffers in practice may indicate what would lie ahead were Americans
adopted a similar model of shared and controlled sentencing discretion.
That is all that can be said with assurance. How a German-like system
would function within the existing American judicial, law enforcement,
and correctional framework, and whether it would be adequate to cope
with the degree and type of crime in America, are matters for speculation and, perhaps, for empirical experimentation.
Sentencing in Germany is based on considerations of retribution
and, to a lesser extent, of rehabilitation and general deterrence. The
common sanctions are fines and probation; imprisonment is imposed
only in very serious cases. The legislature sets statutory sentencing
ranges, but otherwise provides scant guidance. The trial court is therefore responsible for sentencing an offender, but it must give reasons for
sentences and those reasons are subject to intrusive appellate review. A
special correctional court may release an offender from prison before
he serves his entire sentence. In the following pages, I expand on each
of these points. Section I describes the types of sentences authorized by
German law and employed in practice. Sections II, III, and IV respec(explaining the weaknesses of indeterminate sentencing, and urging its retention in a modified form). Others, however, continue to extol the virtues of determinate sentencing. See,
e.g, Nagel & Levy, The Average May Be the Optimum in Determinate Sentencing, 42 U.

PIr. L.

REV.

583 (1981) (a mathematical celebration of determinate sentencing); Crump,

DeterminateSentencing The PromisesandPerils of Sentence Guidelines, 68 Ky. L.J. 1(1979)

(analyzing the effectiveness of determinate sentencing in controlling judicial sentencing
discretion).
7. For discussions of the first two questions see generally von Hirsch & Hanrahan,
Determinate Penalty Systems in America:

An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 289
SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SEN-

(1981) (review of state determinate sentencing procedures); R.

TENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE

SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (1978); Coffee, RepressedIssues of Sentencing: Accountability, Predictability, and Equality in the Era of the Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO.
L.J. 975 (1978) (analyzing predictive models that evaluate offense severity and offer predictions of recidivism in order to set sentencing guidelines).
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tively discuss the distribution of sentencing authority, sentencing procedure, and sentencing principles. The conclusion, Section V, examines
how far Germany has progressed toward a rational, equal, and just sentencing system.
I.

WHAT ARE THE SENTENCES?

German and American criminal statutes have much in common.
The definitions of substantive offenses and the armamentarium of sanctions available to judges are similar, in general and for specific crimes.
Yet the sentences imposed are strikingly different. Consequently, sentence inequalities take on different meanings in the two systems. Sentencing inequality in the United States can mean the difference
between twenty years in prison and three years, or even between imprisonment and no sentence at all.8 Critics of arbitrary sentencing in
Germany, by contrast, compare fifty "day fines" (explained below9 ) to
thirty "day fines," or probation to a fine. Comparison of the United
States and Germany would be misleading if it did not acknowledge this
crucial difference.
One can only speculate as to what causes these huge discrepancies.
Certainly the threat of serious crime is perceived as being much greater
in the United States, and American society feels justified in striking
back with equal force. The high incidence of dangerous crime thus
may have led to a siege mentality on the part of American legislatures
and judges which is absent from German legal thinking and practice.
Despite great differences in education, attitudes, and class background,
German offenders and German judges generally still share a minimum
of common experience and philosophy. And the idea of rehabilitation
has not degenerated into pure cynicism, but creates a spirit of humanism which prevails despite obvious instances of failure.
A. Authorized Sanctions
The German Penal Code or Strafgesetzbuch of 1871, which was
substantially revised in 1975,10 authorizes criminal sanctions similar to
8. See von Hirsch, Current Trends in American CriminalSentencing Theory, 42 MD. L.
REv. 6, 12-13 (1982) (discussing discretion and disparity in America).

9. See infra text accompanying notes 19 to 26.
10. The German Penal Code of 1975 was the capstone of years of controversy and reform. See generally Symposium: The New German Penal Code, 24 AM. J. COMp. L. 589

(1976) (papers on the revision of the German Penal Code). For a particularly interesting
and influential proposal in this debate, see G. ARzT, et al. ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF EINES
STRAFGESETZBUCHES (2d ed. 1969), translatedin ALTERNATIVE DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE
FOR THE FEDERAL PUBLIC OF GERMANY (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes No.
21, J. Darby trans. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ALTERNATIv-ENTWURF].
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those found in any modem American criminal code. The Code also
provides for other measures, such as the "day fine" and "measures of
rehabilitation and safety," which are foreign to American systems.
The death penalty was abolished by the Constitution or Grundgesetz of 1949." Life imprisonment, the most severe sanction known3
under German law,' 2 is mandatory for aggravated murder (Mord),
and genocide,' 4 and may be imposed for treason and in cases resembling the American felony murder.'" For all other offenses for which
imprisonment may be imposed the legislature has prescribed statutory
sentencing ranges or Strafrahmen within which a court determines the
appropriate sentence.' 6 The maximum term of imprisonment, available only for a handful of crimes, is fifteen years.' 7 The minimum is
one month.'" A trial court may choose any sanction within the
Strafrahmen subject to criteria imposed by the legislature and to standards articulated by the appellate courts.
Fines or Geldstrafen provide an alternative 9 to imprisonment for
less serious offenses.2" The court tailors the fine to the gravity of the
offense and to the offender's income by means of the "day fine" system.
11. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 102 (W. Ger.).

12. The federal constitutional court has held that life imprisonment is constitutional. 45
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 187 (1977).
13. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] § 211 (Mord). Mord is distinguished from Totschlag,
(literally "death blow"), which also involves the intentional killing of another, see STGB
§ 212, by the existence of a particularly base motive, e.g., sexual gratification, money, or
covering up another offense, or of a manner demonstrating extraordinary callousness, e.g.,
torture. Id Mord is not the equivalent to "first-degree murder" because "malice aforethought" is not the distinguishing factor.
14. STGB § 220ai I (Vl:0kermord). Section 220a also includes forms of genocide that are
not punished by life imprisonment (e.g., restraining reproduction of an ethnic group).
15. A court may impose life imprisonment for Totschlag, STGB § 2121, and treason,
§ 9411, and for crimes such as kidnapping, §§ 239ai, 239bii, robbery, § 251, and arson,
§ 307, that cause the death of another.
16. The description of each offense in the Code is followed by a provision concerning
the permissible sentence range. For example, § 212 on Totschlag indicates that the penalty
should be between five and 15 years imprisonment. Some sections, e.g., STGB § 239bi (hostage-taking), provide only minimums. The general statutory maximum of 15 years therefore
applies. STGB § 3811. See infra text accompanying note 17.
17. See, e'g., STGB § 177 (first degree rape), § 212 (Totschlag), §§ 249-50 (robbery),
§ 253 (particularly serious cases of extortion).
18. STGB § 3811.
19. German courts rarely impose fines in addition to imprisonment, although the Code
permits the combination if the offender committed the crime for pecuniary gain. STGB § 41.
20. German law distinguishes between Verbrechen (serious offenses), and Vergehen (less
serious offenses), although that differentiation has lost much of its original significance. Verbrechen are offenses that carry a minimum penalty of one year of imprisonment or more; all
others are Vergehen. STGB § 12. Vergehen generally include misdemeanors involving criminal intent or criminal negligence, and nonviolent felonies involving property. Representative offenses include aggravated assault, larceny, embezzlement, and statutory rape.
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The court first sets the number of day fines, from a minimum of five to
a maximum of 360,2 1 according to the seriousness of the crime. Next,
the court determines the offender's daily net income after deducting a

sum for family support and other necessary expenses. A single day fine
can range from approximately one dollar to $5,000. The court then
computes the amount owed by multiplying the offender's daily net income by the number of day fines, so the product can range from five
dollars to $1.8 million.2 2 A fine thus can be more than a slap on the
wrist. In practice, however, fines rarely exceed the aggregate amount of
$800.23
The fine is transformed automatically into a jail sentence if the

offender does not pay up. The number of day fines imposed and unpaid equals the number of days to be spent in jail. 24 Although there is

no requirement of wilful non-payment for imprisonment, courts rarely
impose this harsh alternative. According to a recent study, only four
percent of those sentenced to pay a fine end up in jail." The remainder
manage to pay, albeit at the last minute or by means of liberal installment programs granted by the court.2 6
German law also provides for probation - the conditional suspension of the execution of sentences.2 7 If the court expects that the
21. STGB § 401.
22. STGB § 4011. This discussion assumes that one U.S. dollar is roughly equal to two
Deuischemark (DM).
23. H. ALBRECHT,

STRAFZUMESSUNG

UND VOLLSTRECKUNG

BEU GELDSTRAFEN

202

(Strafrecht und Kriminologie No. 8, 1980).
24. STGB § 43. This raises the possibility that an offender could be imprisoned for a
term less than the statutory minimum of one month. See STGB § 3811. Some commentators
have criticized the jailing of those unable to pay. See, e.g., Silving, Discussion of Sanctions,
24 AM. J. COMp. L. 737, 749 (1976).
25. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 233.
26. In some German states an impecunious defendant can sign up for public work, e.g.,
in parks or forests, and thus work off the fine. Experience so far has shown, however, that
few defendants make use of this opportunity; administrative costs per defendant are therefore high. See Baumann, Die Chance des Artikel 293 EGStGB." Freie gemeinnu.tzige Arbeit
start Ersatzfreiheisstrafe, 62

MONATSSCHRIFT

FUR KRIMINOLOGIE

UND

STRAFRECHTS-

REFORM [MKS] 290 (1980).
27. Probation under German law thus is not an independent sanction; the trial court
suspends the execution of an imposed sentence. STGB § 56. See Eser, Germany, 21 AM. J.
COMP. L. 245, 254 (1973); Herrmann, Sanctions. German Law and Theory, 24 AM. J. COMP.
L. 718, 727 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Herrman, Sanctions]. For minor offenses, the court
also can give the offender a formal warning, or Verwarnungmit Straftorbehalt, and suspend
the imposition of the sentence. STGB §§ 59-59c. American jurisdictions are divided
whether probation involves the suspension of the imposition of a sentence, see, e.g., People
v. Arguello, 59 Cal. 2d 475, 476, 381 P.2d 5, 6, 30 Cal. Rptr. 333, 334, (1963), or suspension of
the execution of an imposed sentence, see, e.g., State v. Dull, 249 So. 2d 758, 760 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971). The American Bar Association has criticized this distinction as creating
unnecessary semantic and legal confusion. See STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION
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offender will not commit any crimes if the sentence is not executed, it
may in its discretion suspend a sentence of imprisonment up to one
year.2 8 The trial court also can order probation under "special circumstances," which are not defined by statute, in lieu of sentences of imprisonment between one and two years.2 9 During the probation period,
which can range from two to five years, the offender usually is supervised by a probation officer and may have to fulfill additional conditions, such as paying damages, making a charitable contribution, or
maintaining a certain residence.3 °
Parole also is regarded as a conditional suspension of the execution of part of a prison sentence. A prisoner must be paroled when he
has served two thirds of his sentence if he is not likely to commit a new
offense. 3 ' Under "special circumstances characterizing the offense and
the personality of the offender," the Code authorizes suspension of
prison sentences of two years or longer after the prisoner serves one
half of the sentence.3 z In practice, however, courts rarely grant parole
before the offender has served two thirds of the original term.3 3
The court will revoke probation or parole if the offender commits
a new criminal offense or seriously violates the conditions imposed on
him.3 4 No formal re-sentencing is necessary: the offender on probation
must serve the prison term originally imposed; in cases of parole, he
must serve the remaining part of his sentence. He receives no credit for
time spent on probation or parole but he may receive credit for
financial contributions made as a condition of probation or parole. 35
The German Penal Code distinguishes between two kinds of sanctions: the penalties discussed above for criminal behavior and measures of rehabilitation and safety. The latter sanctions are not punitive
§ 1.1(b) commentary at 25 (Approved Draft 1970). Maryland's probation statute allows the
court to "suspend the imposition or execution of sentence .
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 641 A (1982) (emphasis added).
28. STGB § 561. The section lists several factors the court must consider, such as the
defendant's prior life, his post-offense conduct, and the seriousness of the offense.
29. STGB § 5611. Sentences exceeding one year are rare and are reserved for more serious offenses. Suspension of these sentences is limited to exceptional cases, such as mercy
killing, or perjury for honorable motives. See, e.g., Herrmann, Sanctions, supra note 27, at
728 (advocating this limitation).
30. STGB §§ 56b-56d.
31. STGB § 571.
32. STGB § 57I1.
33. In 1979, only 0.2% of all persons released from prison were paroled before they had
served two thirds of their terms. F. Dtlnkel & A. Rosner, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES
STRAFVOLLZUGS IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND: MATERIALIEN UND ANALYSEN
77 (1981); E. DREHER, STRAFGESETZBUCH § 57 n.4 (1975).

34. STGB §§ 56f, 57111.
35. STGB § 56fl11.
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and enable a German court to help the individual and to protect the
public without stretching punishment beyond the limits of the desert
principle. Measures of rehabilitation and safety include commitment
to a psychiatric hospital,3 6 commitment to an institution for alcohol or
drug treatment," commitment to an institution of social therapy, 8 security custody, 39 and noncustodial sanctions such as revocation of a
driver's license and prohibition against working in a particular trade or
profession.' These measures are related not to the offender's blame-

worthiness, but to his dangerousness. 4 In practice, only revocation of
drivers' licenses is ordered with any frequency.42

Table I gives representative statutory sentence ranges for Germany
36. STGB § 63. There is no maximum term of confinement, but the court must examine
the case once every year to see whether confinement is still necessary. STGB § 67eli.
37. STGB § 64. Commitment for withdrawal treatment cannot exceed two years. STGB
§ 67di.
38. STGB § 65. Section 65 is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1985, but because of
a lack of funds and the disappearance of the original enthusiasm for social therapy, the
section's introduction may be deferred indefinitely. Institutions of social therapy are intended to deal with four groups of persons: dangerous habitual criminals with significant
personality dysfunctions, dangerous sexual offenders, young offenders who evidence a tendency to become habitual offenders, and persons in need of psychiatric help under § 63 but
whose needs are better suited to treatment in an institution of social therapy. Id A court
could sentence to an institution of social therapy only a defendant whom it expects will
respond to treatment. Confinement would not exceed five years. STGB § 67di.
39. STGB § 66. The dangerous habitual offender is committed to security custody "if
the public safety requires it." The offender, however, must have two prior convictions resulting in imprisonment for serious offenses, currently face a prison term of at least two
years, and be found by the court to be likely to commit future serious offenses and thus to be
dangerous to the community. The maximum commitment for security custody is 10 years.
STGB § 67di. The Court must review the commitment every two years. STGB § 66.
40. Measures of rehabilitation and safety that do not involve imprisonment include:
probationary surveillance, STGB §§ 68-68g, revocation of driver's license, STGB §§ 69-69b,
and prohibition against practicing a particular profession, STGB §§ 70-70b. The revocation
or suspension of a driver's license under STGB §§ 69-69b is to be distinguished from the
punitive suspension for traffic offenses which is limited to one to three months. See STGB
§44.
41. The German Penal Code states, however:
A measure of rehabilitation and safety may not be imposed if it would be not in proportion to the seriousness of the offenses the offender has committed or probably will commit as well as to the danger he causes.
STGB § 62.
Measures of rehabilitation and safety if enacted in America might meet the perceived need to restrain violent offenders while retaining a determinate sentencing system.
See Barkdull, The DeterminateSentence and the Violent Offender.- What Happens When the
Time Runs Out?, 44:2 FED. PROBATION 18 (1980) (discussing the experience in California);
Selective Sentencing Suggestedfor PredatoryCrimes, The Daily Record (Baltimore), Oct. 8,
1982, at 4, col. I (long sentences for "onmi felons").
42. In 1980, measures of rehabilitation and safety were imposed on 196,254 defendants.
Eighty-five percent of these measures (167,697) involved the revocation of a driver's license.
STATISTISHEs BUNDESAMT, STRAFVERFOLGUNG 1980 30 (1981).
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and Maryland. The elements of criminal offenses in the two systems
are not identical, but those selected for this table are roughly

comparable.
TABLE 143
REPRESENTATIVE STATUTORY SENTENCE RANGES

CRIME
Murder, 1st degree"

Manslaughter

5

Aggravated Assault'
47
First degree rape

GERMANY
Imprisonment of 5 to
15 years or life
(under heinous
circumstances)
Fine, probation, or
imprisonment up to
5 years
Fine, probation, or
imprisonment up to
5 years
Probation or
imprisonment of 6
months to 15 years

MAR YLA ND
Probation, life
imprisonment, or
death
Fine, probation,
and/or imprisonment
up to 10 years
Probation or
imprisonment of two
to 30 years
Probation or
imprisonment up to
life

43. The substantive elements of each offense are from the German Penal Code, but the
denomination of each offense in the left-hand column is from the Maryland Annotated
Code. Some Maryland offenses may include behavior not within the scope of the particular
section of the German Penal Code.
44. STGB §§ 211, 212; see STGB § 3811; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 407, 412(b) (1982).
The German offenses of Mord (§ 211) and Totschlag (§ 212) both involve a premeditated
killing. The offenses are distinguished by other circumstances. See supra note 13.
Probation may be granted in Maryland if the offense is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. If the offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court
can impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to the imprisonment. MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 641A (1982). Unless limited by the particular sentencing statute, a court
may suspend a "mandatory" life sentence. State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829
(1976).
45. STGB §§ 222, 213; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1982).
46. STGB § 223a (Gefahrliche Korperverletzung); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 12 (1982).
Maryland has no statutory sentencing range for any assault offense except assault with intent
to murder, ravish, or rob, which is a narrower offense than Gefahrliche Korperverletzung.
The maximum sentence that a judge in Maryland can impose for any simple or
aggravated assault is 30 years, which is the maximum for an assault with intent to murder.
The cruel and unusual punishment provision of the eighth amendment may require that the
punishment for a lesser offense should not be more severe than the punishment for a greater
offense. See Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1976); see also Roberts v.
Warden, 242 Md. 459, 460-61, 219 A.2d 254, 255 (1965); Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 71727, 421 A.2d 957, 961-65 (1980).
47. STGB § 177; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 462 (1982).
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Arson

48

Robbery4 9

Robbery50 with deadly
weapon

Probation or
imprisonment of 1 to
15 years
Probation or
imprisonment of 6
months to 15 years
Probation or
imprisonment of 1 to
15 years

Probation or
imprisonment up to
30 years
Restoration,

restitution, probation,
or imprisonment of 3
to 10 years
Restoration,
restitution, probation,
or imprisonment up
to 20 years

The sentence ranges differ to some extent: German law favors
higher minimum prison sentences (but usually offers probation as an
alternative), whereas Maryland has higher maxima. The similarities,
however, are more pronounced than these differences. In both systems,
sentencing judges are accorded a wide latitude of sentencing options
with respect to all offenses.
B.

Imposed Sanctions

Comparison of statutory sentence ranges sheds light on the sentencing latitude each system allows the court but tells little about
sentences actually imposed. Table II compares sentences imposed by
German courts and by Maryland courts for similar crimes. As neither
the definitions of offenses nor the features of sentences are identical,
this juxtaposition provides only a rough illustration of variations in
sentencing practices in the two systems.

48. STGB § 306 (Schwere Brandsqftung), § 308 (Brandstifiung);MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§§ 6-9 (1982). In especially serious cases of arson, Besonders schwere Brandsqftung, life
imprisonment is optional. STGB § 307.
49. STGB § 249; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 486 (1982). A Maryland court may
disregard the statutory minimum for robbery in certain circumstances. MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 643 (1982).
50. STGB § 250 (aggravated robbery); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 488 (1982).
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TABLE II
Distribution of Sentencesfor Selected Offenses, West German
Courts and Maryland Courts5'
Case

Number of case

Fine
only

Probation
only

up to Iyar

I to 3

Imprisonment
3 to 5

52
5 to 10 10+

Murder

Maryland
Germany

156
551

0.4%

9%

0%
1%

.6%
15%

2%
23%

8.3% 89.1%
28%
25%

Rape

Maryland
Germany

123
887

0.8%

31%

0%
4%

8%
41%

11%
17%

236
6%

57%
0.3%

Robbery Maryland
Gereany

856
2069

1%

27%

2%
5%

11%
38%

25%
14%

35%
14%

28%
1%

Maryland
Germany

510
20954

79%

14%

20%
5%

33%
1%

17%
0.1%

20%
9%
0.01%

Burglary Maryland
Germany

804
11476

18%

39%

10%
23%

30%
18%

27%
2%

32%
0.3%

0.087%

Forgery

46
10365

69%

19%

11%
7%

41%
4%

22%
0.5%

22%
0.2%

5%
-

Ataualt

Maryland
Germany

Although conclusions should be drawn from the above figures
only with caution, several stark differences stand out. German courts
seldom impose prison terms longer than five years except for intentional homicide, whereas Maryland judges routinely give long prison
sentences in cases of violent felonies. Short prison terms of less than
one year are rare in both systems except for burglary in Germany. Probation and fine statistics are unavailable for Maryland, but German
practice is striking in its greater use of probation for serious offenses,
and less use when sentencing minor property offenders. And most important, the fine is the usual sanction for non-aggravated property
53
crimes and assaults in Germany.
51. The Maryland statistics are for Fiscal Year 1982 and were supplied by Richard A.
Tamberrino, the Director of Research and Statistics of the Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services for the State of Maryland. The German statistics are for 1980 and are
STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, STRAFVERFOLGUNG 1980 52-71 (1981). Because of rounding,
the totals may not equal 100%.
52. Maryland statistics for probation and fines imposed as the only sanction are
unavailable from the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services of the State of
Maryland. Probation, however, is a frequently imposed sanction. "Probation Intake"
statistics for Fiscal Year 1982, which include both sentences of probation that are the sole
sanction and sentences that begin after a term of imprisonment, show heavy use of
probation:
Offense
Number of Probationers Entering System
Murder
17
Rape
30
Robbery
422
Assault
2,846
Burglary
1,804
Forgery
580
53. A study on fines in Germany completed in 1979 demonstrates their growing importance. In 1967, fines made up 61% of all criminal sanctions; by 1977, their share had risen to
83%. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 4. Fines are the typical punishment for first offenders:
of that group, only 2.9% were sentenced to probation or imprisonment in 1972; all others
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Since the 1930's, German scholars studying sentencing practices
have found that most sentences imposed are at the lower end of the
statutory punishment scale,14 which for most offenses means a fine.
Two factors may account for this. First, German law prefers fines to
short-term imprisonment as a penalty not only for economic reascas
but also because of their greater social efficiency. The fine avoids the
moral and social disintegration necessarily connected with a prison
term and allows the offender to retain the self-image of a "normal"
citizen rather than causing him to think of himself as a criminal."
Only when the culpability of the offender is so great that the public
would regard a fine or probation as clearly insufficient do German
courts resort to imposing prison terms of moderate length (usually one
to five years).
Second, although statutory descriptions of offenses necessarily encompass the most serious generic violations of social norms, most cases
that come before German courts are petty violations, such as retail
theft, minor fraud, and drunken driving. 6 If drunken driving cases are
left aside, most of any German criminal court's workload is property
crime. The majority even of these and other offenses are less serious, if
not petty, violations of the law.57 The ordinary case of larceny, fraud,
assault, and battery is thus of lesser gravity than the hypothetical "median" case to which the "median" sentence of each offense is geared.5 8

were fined. Id at 98-99. More than one half of those who had earlier received a prison
sentence received only a fine for a subsequent offense. (This last statistic may reflect more
the pettiness of the subsequent offense than the insignificance of recidivism as a factor in
selecting the type of punishment). See also Gillespie, Finesas an Alternative to Incarceration.:
The German Experience, 44:4 FED. PROBATION 20 (1980).
54. Hassemer, Die Formalisierungder Strafzumessungsent scheidung, 90 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [ZSTW 64, 78 (1978); Seebald, Strafmassempfehlungen gemass der typologischen Hdufigkeit, 53 DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG [DRZ]
4, 6 (1975); Ostermeyer, Die Regelstrafe: Ein Versuch zur Linderung des Unbehagens bei der
Sirafzumessung, 19 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2301, 2302 (1966); F. ExNER, STUDIEN UBER DIE STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS DER DEUTSCHEN GERICHTE 81 (1931).
55. See generally H. ZIPF, DIE GELDSTRAFE IN IHRER FUNKTION ZUR EINDAMMUNG
DER KURZEN FREIHEITSSTRAFE (1966).
56. In 1980, of more than 900,000 persons accused of criminal offenses, 42% were

charged with serious traffic offenses such as drunken driving (lesser offenses not being covered by the Penal Code), and 33% with nonviolent property crimes. Sex offenders and robbers together constituted less than 2% of the courts' clientele. STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT,
STRAFVERFOLGUNG 1980 28 (1981).
57. According to police statistics, in 68% of all reported cases of simple or aggravated
larceny (including burglary) the damage was below the equivalent of U.S. $400.
BUNDESKRIMINALAMT, POLIZEILICHE KRIMINALSTATISTIK 1981 88, 95 (1982).
58. Dreher, Ober Strafrahmen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS-JORGEN BRUNS ZUM 70.
GEBURTSTAG 141, 150 (W. Frisch & W. Schmid eds. 1978).
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If German sentences appear generally low, this may be a reflection of
the generally low intensity of criminal behavior in Germany.
II.

WHO SENTENCES?

Every legal system distributes the function of sentencing among
several agents. Although the German system generally regards sentencing as the business of the trial court, others are involved as well.
The legislature determines the limits of punishment for each offense.
The prosecutor, unlike his American counterpart, lacks meaningful
charging discretion but can influence the sentence in various other
ways. Laymen also play an important role: except in petty cases, sentencing is not left to a single professional judge but to a mixed panel
consisting of professional and lay judges. Finally, the German
equivalent of parole is granted by a special panel of the district court
which is located closest to the prison where the offender is detained.
A.

Legislature

The impact of legislative decisions on individual sentences is
greater in theory than in practice. Scholars and courts alike repeatedly
have emphasized the theoretical importance of the legislature's task:
by defining the lower and upper limits of punishment the law-giver
expresses the degree of society's disapproval of each offense. As the
severity of the sanction correlates with the importance of the protected
social interest, the legislature, by setting sentence standards, establishes
a rank order of values and interests which binds every participant in
the process.59
Unfortunately, the broad statutory sentencing ranges make the
rank ordering of offenses less precise than it could be, thus weakening
the legislature's impact on the sentencing process. These policy statements on social and moral priorities could be expressed more clearly by
fixed penalties or narrower sentence ranges for each offense. Such legislative rigor would enable an individual to forsee the exact consequences of his acts, and would reduce drastically the discretionary
powers of the executive and judicial branches of government. Yet German theory, while staunchly requiring certainty in the description of an
offense and subsequent sanction,' has never reached out toward the
chimera of "flat" sentencing.
59. 27 BVerfG 18, 29 (1969); 45 BVerfG 187,256 (1977); H. JESCHECK, W. Russ & G.
WILLMS, STRAFGESETZBUCH, LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR § 46 n.34 (10th ed. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR]; Dreher, supra note 58, at 150.
60. The principle of legality or nullapoena sine lege is set forth in Article 103(2) of the
Grundgesetz or Constitution.
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The elimination of all discretion would collide with a basic tenet
of German sentencing philosophy: the desert principle. Punishment in
Germany must be commensurate with the culpability of the offender. 6 '
The desert principle requires the court to assess the extent of the defendant's deviation from common ethical standards and to determine
the penalty accordingly. The task of tailoring the punishment to the
offender's individual culpability requires information not available to
even the most informed legislature or sentencing commission and
therefore must be left to the trial court.
German discomfort with nondiscretionary sentencing is illustrated
by the controversy over one of the two flat sentencing provisions of the
German Penal Code. Section 211, which prescribes life imprisonment
as the only penalty for first degree murder,6 2 raises serious constitutional questions. In 1976, one district court found the provision to be
unconstitutional, holding that section 211, by excluding all judicial discretion, violated the principles of equal protection 63 and proportionality between crime and punishment as guaranteed by the Rechtsstaat or
due process clause of the Constitution. 64 Mandatory sentences, the
court maintained, cannot adequately reflect differences of culpability
among individual offenders. 65 The Federal Constitutional Court6 6 rejected that argument, however, observing that the elements of the legal
definition of first degree murder 67 leave some room for judicial interpretation and adjustment, and that the Code allows for lesser punishment in cases of reduced responsibility because of mental
impairment.6 8 Thus, the rigid sentencing provision of Section 211
passed constitutional muster only because "in practice the threat of life
imprisonment . . . is less absolute than appears at first blush. 6 9
The 1977 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court failed to
conclude the debate. In 1981, the Federal Appellate Court again confronted the question whether a life sentence is appropriate in every case
61. In the German system, a criminal sanction must be proportionate to the offense.
Only then does the offender get his "just deserts." See infra text accompanying notes 185 to
192.
62. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. Life imprisonment is also mandatory
for certain genocide offenses. STGB § 220a.
63. GG art. 3.
64. GG art. 28.
65. Judgment of Landgericht [LG, or district court] Verden of March 5, 1976, 29 NJW
980, 981 (1976).
66. The Federal Constitutional Court, as its name suggests, decides the constitutionality
of statutes that have been called into doubt. GG art. 100.
67. See supra note 13.
68. 45 BVerfG 187,261-62 (1977).
69. Id. at 261.
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of murder. The court declared that the constitutional principle of proportionality required mitigation of punishment if "extraordinary circumstances" had prompted the offense.7" The court thus applied a
general mitigation clause designed only for cases of attempt and impaired responsibility, 7' and reduced the maximum penalty to fifteen
years imprisonment notwithstanding the clear language of the statute
to the contrary.
Despite the turmoil over section 211, the claim that the legislature
unduly curtails judicial sentencing discretion is exceptional. Critics
mbre often charge the legislature with improperly delegating sentencing responsibility to the courts, leaving judges with no guide but their
consciences.72 Those charges are plainly justified with respect to many
offenses. Extortion is a clear example: An offender can be sentenced to
pay a fine or to serve a term of imprisonment of one to five years; in
"particularly serious cases," a term not defined by the Code, the sentence can be as severe as fifteen years imprisonment.7 3
Special sentence ranges for "particularly light" and "particularly
serious" cases provide sentencing courts with additional leeway to deal
with extraordinary offenses. The legislature did not define these terms,
but it responded recently to criticism that it seldom provides standards
for sentencing by adding enumerations of aggravating circumstances,
or Regelbeispiele, which give rise to a presumption that the case is "particularly serious" and thus deserving of a stiffer sentence. 4 The court
70. 30 BGHSt 105 (1981). This case involved Turkish nationals residing in Germany.
The deceased, an uncle of the defendant, had raped the defendant's wife and had bragged
about the act in the Turkish community. The defendant's wife thereupon attempted suicide
several times and sought a divorce. About six months after learning of the rape, the defendant walked into a bar where the deceased was playing cards with several friends. The defendant watched his uncle for a while and then, without warning, fired 14 shots from a
pistol, killing his uncle on the spot. The defendant's conduct met the murder statute's requirement of "malice" as had been developed by earlier decisions of the Federal Appellate
Court.
71. STGB § 49.
72. See, e.g., T. LENCKNER, P. CRAMER, A. ESER & W. STREET, SCHONKE & SCHRODER
STRAFGESETZBUCH § 46 n.7 (21st ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as SCH6NKE & SCHR65DER]; R.
MAURACH & H. ZiPF, STRAFRECHT 412 (5th ed. 1978).
73. STGB § 253.
74. Section 243, concerning "particularly serious" cases of larceny, is in practical terms
the most important example of a Regelbeispiele provision. The section presumptively raises
the maximum penalty from five years imprisonment to 10 years if one of the following
aggravating circumstances exists:
(1) the thief broke into a building;
(2) the stolen object was secured against theft;
(3) the offender is a professional thief;
(4) the stolen object is one of religious veneration;
(5) the stolen object was exhibited in a museum or art collection open to the public; or
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may disregard the existence of Regelbeispiele or may label the offense
"particularly serious" in the absence of any circumstances enumerated
in the statute, but in either event must give specific reasons to justify its
decision." Most legal writers regard the introduction of Regelbeispiele
as a major improvement because it structures judicial discretion but
leaves room for appropriate disposition of exceptional cases.76
The debate over allocating sentencing authority between the legislative and judicial branches has resulted in a compromise. The legislature sets comparatively broad limits, sometimes indicating substantive
factors to be considered by the trial courts, who in turn remain free to
"individualize" sentences within limits imposed by the appellate courts.
B.

The Prosecutor

Germans tend to view sentencing as the exclusive province of the
trial court, overlooking the influence of the public prosecutor, or
Staalsanwalt, whose involvement is hidden from public view.
Prosecutorial influence is not as blatant as it is in the United States,
where broad charging discretion, overt sentence bargaining, and sentence "recommendations" which everyone accepts as binding often
turn the prosecutor into the true decision-maker.
A significant difference in legal status exists between American
and German prosecutors. Although both represent the state in criminal
proceedings, German law casts the prosecutor in a more neutral position. He is to uphold the law, not simply to seek conviction. The German Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly provides that the
prosecutor shall investigate exonerating as well as inculpatory circumstances.77 If the prosecutor believes that the defendant is innocent, he
is duty-bound at the end of the trial to plead for acquittal (the court
although is not obliged to acquit).78 Given the objective, almost judicial position of the German prosecutor,7 9 he can safely be trusted to
(6)

the offender took advantage of an accident or the helplessness of another.
supra note 72, § 243 n.42.
76. See, e.g., LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.50; R. MAURACH & H.
ZIPF, supra note 72, at 421; Wessels, Zur Problematik der Regelbeispielefur "schwere" und
"besondersschwere Falle," in FESTSCHRIFT FUR REINHART MAURACH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 295 (1972).
77. STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] § 16011.
78. K. PETERS, STRAFPROZESS 152 (3d ed. 1981).
79. Historically, the office of the prosecutor in Germany has its roots in the judiciary.
The tasks of the inquisitorial judge, a common figure in civil-law criminal systems, were
divided in Germany in the nineteenth century between the trial court and the public prosecutor. See T. WEIGEND, ANKLAGEPFLICHT UND ERMESSEN 53-58 (1978); Damaska, Versuche zur Rationalisierung der Strafzumessung in den U.S.A., 93 ZSTW 119 (1981);
Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of ProsecutorialDiscretionin
75.

SCH6NKE & SCHRODER,
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share sentencing authority with the judge.
Despite the prosecutor's quasi-judicial position, the German Code
of Criminal Procedure prescribes and controls his actions to an extent
that must baffle American jurists.8 0 A rule of compulsory prosecution
compels the prosecutor to prefer charges in more serious offenses whenever the evidence makes conviction of the suspect at trial probable.8 '
The court, not the prosecutor, decides upon the legal characterization
of the charge.8 2 The prosecutor may not withdraw the charge once the
court accepts it, even in light of changed circumstances, and his sentencing recommendations in no way bind the court.
The letter of the law makes it appear as if the prosecutor decides
little in the criminal system, least of all the sentence. Reality, however,
is different. The prosecutor codetermines the sanction imposed upon
the defendant in three common situations: penal orders, sentencing
recommendations, and conditional suspension of prosecution.
1. Penal Orders - The court may dispose of minor cases, or
Vergehen,83 in a written procedure known as a Strabefehlsverfahren, or
a penal order proceeding.8 4 On the basis of the prosecutor's file, the
court issues a provisional judgment, whicn sets forth the sentence, usually a day fine, but never imprisonment.8 5 If the defendant appeals
the judgment
within a week, an ordinary trial is held. Otherwise,
86
becomes final and has the status of a conviction.
Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 469 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Herrmann, Compulsory
Prosecution];Langbein, ControllingProsecutorialDiscretionin Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
439, 446 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Langbein, ProsecutorialDiscretion].
80. See Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining. How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 204, 210-12 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining];
Langbein and Weinreb, ContinentalCriminalProcedure.- "Myth " and Reality, 87 YALE L.J.
1549, 1561-65 (1978); Herrmann, Compulsory Prosecution, supra note 79, at 469.

The prosecutor is constrained not only by the definition of his office, but also by
strong professional standards, which are enforced by effective internal review. Promotion of
prosecutors and judges (who frequently are former prosecutors) is based on merit. See
Langbein, ProsecutorialDiscretion, supra note 79, at 466.

81. STPO § 152. The prosecutor must find "sufficient cause for filing a public accusation." STPO § 1701. See generally Weigend, ContinentalCuresforAmerican Ailments: European CriminalProcedureas a Modelfor Law Reform, in 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE 381, 399-404
(N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1980); [hereinafter cited as Weigend, Continental Cures] Herr-

mann, Compulsory Prosecution,supra note 79, at 469.
82. STPO §§ 206, 20711(3).
83. Vergehen are crimes equivalent to American misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies
involving property. Examples include assault, car theft, embezzlement, tax fraud, and shoplifting. See supra note 20.

84. STPO §§ 407-12. Such minor offenses are handled by a single professional judge; no
lay judges are involved.
85. STPO § 40711.
86. STPO §§ 410, 4091(7).
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The prosecutor dominates the penal order proceeding: he decides
whether a Strafbefehl is employed instead of a trial and drafts the provisional judgment which includes a sentence. 7 The judge receives
Strafbefehl applications on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. He can refuse to
issue the penal order as drafted and order a trial, but he has no authority to alter it.88 The penalty in a penal order proceeding thus effectively
is determined by the prosecutor, with only nominal control by the
judge in whose name the penal order issues.
Judges almost never withhold consent. Court statistics for 1980
indicate that the judge ordered a trial instead of issuing the penal order
in 0.6% of all cases in which the prosecutor filed an application for
penal order.8 9 This figure does not mean that the judge meekly goes
along with whatever disposition the prosecutor proposes, but indicates
that informal channels exist for reaching agreement between prosecutor and judge. Internal rules explicitly direct the judge to attempt to
reconcile his differences with the prosecutor by negotiation rather than
to deny a Strafbefehl application. 90 Although the frequency of such
informal discussions is not known, few lawyers doubt that the prosecutor, not the judge, determines the sentence in the ordinary Strafbefehl
case.

91

Penal orders, which save time and labor for all concerned and
guarantee the defendant that he will not serve a term of imprisonment,
have become a major part of the German criminal process. Almost
half of all criminal cases in which the prosecutor files an accusation are

87. STPO §§ 407, 408.

88. STPO § 40811. A judge, for example, may deny a penal order when he has doubts
about the defendant's guilt, when there is a record of recidivism, or if the offender requires
individualized treatment. Felstiner, Plea Contractsin West Germany, 13 LAW & Soc. 309,

310 (1979).
89. STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, STRAFGERICHTE 1980 20, 26 (1981). One empirical
study of more than 5000 criminal files found no case in which the judge refused to sign a
penal order. E. BLANKENBURG, K. SESSAR, & W. STEFFEN, DIE STAATSANWALTSCHAFT IM
PROZESS STRAFRECHTLICHER SOZIALKONTROLLE 117 (1978). Another found one such instance among 1,823 cases. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 95.
90. Richtlinienfar das Strafverfahren und das Bussgeldverfahren[Un!form Rules of Criminal Procedure] 1606 (1981). § 1781 in T. KLEINKNECHT, STRAFPROZASSORDNUNG. See

STPO § 40811 (authorizing judge to discuss Strafbefehl with the prosecutor).
91. One author claims that "[a] judge in Hamburg told [the author] that he could review
70 routine cases in fifteen minutes (shoplifting, for instance, or riding a subway without a
ticket), an average of one case every 13 seconds .... ." Felstiner, supra note 88, at 312
(emphasis in original). Courts, however, will pay greater attention to unusual cases, such as
"a psychologically disturbed defendant, a problem too complicated to be captured on paper,
a difficult family situation, an offense with a history, or a defendant who appears to contest
the facts." Id at 313.
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processed by Strafbefehl.9 2 The great majority of fines imposed for
assault, larceny, fraud, and the more serious traffic offenses (the penal
code does not cover less serious traffic offenses9 3 ) are disposed of by
penal order.94 Approximately eighty-five percent of penal orders
drafted become final because the defendant either acquiesces or later
withdraws his appeal.9 5
2. Sentence Recommendations - Although disagreement between the prosecutor and judge is extremely rare in Straflbefehl cases, it
occurs more frequently when a trial is held. At the end of a trial, if the
prosecutor believes the defendant is guilty, he will recommend a specific sentence. A recent study suggests that courts view this recommendation as the most severe appropriate sentence and will follow the
prosecutor's suggestion in approximately half of all cases. Only rarely
will courts impose a harsher sentence.96 Even when the court does not
follow the prosecutor's recommendation, the deviation tends to be
slight. 97
The German prosecutor's influence on sentences imposed at trial is
much less than that of his American counterpart.9 8 A prosecutor can
be expected to adapt his recommendation to the known sentencing
practices of the court, sometimes adding a "bonus" which can be subtracted to mollify the defense. The widespread reluctance of courts to
pronounce a harsher sentence than those proposed by the prosecutor
92. In 1980, German prosecutors moved for a trial in 494,000 cases and a penal order in
428,000 cases. STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, STRAFGERICHTE 1980 20, 26 (1981).
93. The German Penal Code covers only the most serious traffic offenses such as driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, culpably injuring persons or damaging valuable
property, and leaving the scene of an accident. All other traffic violations are regarded as
noncriminal and disposed of by a special administrative procedure under the Gesetz iber
Ordnungswidrigkeiten, or Administrative Violations Act.
94. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 21, at 94; E. BLANKENBURG, K. SESSAR, & W. STEFFEN,

supra note 84, at 70; Felstiner, supra note 88, at 311.
95. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 21, at 94, 96. Approximately 90% of those who go to trial
are found guilty. Felstiner, supra note 88, at 314.
96. One author found that courts will follow the prosecutor's suggestion in about 50% of
all cases. A lower sentence was pronounced in 43% percent; only in the remaining 7% did
the sentence imposed exceed the sentence proposed. D. DOLLING, DIE ZWEITEILUNG DER
HAUPTVERHANDLUNG 211 (1978).

97. Only in about 8% of all cases were "considerable" differences found between the
sentence suggested by the prosecutor and the sentence actually imposed. Id
98. The vast majority of American prosecutors also make specific sentencing recommendations. Teitelbaum, The Prosecutor'sRole in the Sentencing Process: A NationalSurvey, 1

AM. J. CRIM. L. 75 (1972). This practice has been severely criticized. See, e.g., STANDARDS
RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVE AND PROCEDURES § 5.3 commentary (c) at 242
(Approved Draft 1968) ("[S]ystematic recommendations from the office of the prosecutor
might induce too much reliance by the court as a substitute for independent formulation of
the sentence.").
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evidences an ability of the prosecutor effectively to "put a lid" on the
sentence received by the defendant.9 9
3. ConditionalSuspension of Prosecution - The third mode of
prosecutorial influence in the sentencing process is the conditional suspension of prosecution, which resembles American diversion." °° The
public prosecutor, under section 153a of the German Code of Criminal
Procedure, with the consent of the court (except in nonserious property
offenses) and the defendant, can suspend prosecution of Vergehen if the
offender's culpability is minor.' 0
The suspension is conditioned upon the defendant making restitution to the victim, or paying a sum of money to the state or to a charitable organization. The court enters no formal finding of guilt; the order
to pay is technically not a criminal sentence. 0 2 In practice, however,
these payments are hard to distinguish from ordinary fines. Everyone
involved regards them as a sanction for the defendant's transgressions
even though no sentence is imposed by a court. Conditional suspension of prosecution thus permits the prosecutor to determine the appropriate sanction in many less serious offenses and, since its inception in
1975, it has become a popular prosecutorial device. 0 3
The requirement that the defendant consent to the forfeiture of his
rights is likely to evoke the image of plea bargaining in the American
reader. Section 153a resembles an invitation to barter. Instances of
99. Contrary to what Americans might expect, there is no real sentence bargaining between prosecutors and defense counsel. German prosecutors would resent strongly any attempt to influence their professional judgment at any stage of the proceeding. See generally
Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,supra note 80.
100. Diversion. . . refers to the legal pretrial exercise by the police, probation personnel, the prosecutor, or the judge of discretion to suspend or otherwise hold in
abeyance charges against selected defendants [such as underemployed minor offenders or alcoholics] for a specified period of time, on condition that the defendant participate in a prescribed program of rehabilitative activity or refrain from
activity of a criminal nature, and on the stipulation that if the accused fulfills the
condition, the charges will be dismissed.
Bims, Diversionfrom the CriminalProcess, 62 A.B.A.J. 1145, 1145 (1976); see also Nejelski,
Diversion." Unleashing the Hound ofHeaven?, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD (Rosenheim ed. 1976) (discussion of juvenile diversion); R. NIMMER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH
FOR ALTERNATE FORMS OF PROSECUTION (1974).

101. STPO §§ 153a. The offender's culpability must be gering, which may be translated
also as "slight" or "trifling."
102. Id
103. In 1978, 28% of all discretionary dismissals were based on section 153a; in 1979, 17%
of all defendants who were sentenced in any way were ordered to make payments under this
section. Riess, Statistische Beitrage zur Wirklichkeit des Strafverfahrens, in FESTSCHRIFT
FUR WERNER SARSTEDT ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 253, 281-82, 282 n.93a, 307 (Hamm ed.
1981).

19831

SENTENCING IN WEST GERMANY

negotiations certainly occur, and the subtle pressures on the defendant
to accept the solution proposed by the professionals are not unlike
04
those felt by an American defendant who is offered a plea bargain.
Yet it would be an exaggeration to say that section 153a conduces to
party involvement in the sentencing decision. I0 5 The self-esteem of
German prosecutors, who regard themselves not as partisans but as
quasi-judicial officers, disinclines them to permit meaningful outside
interference with their decisions."0 6 Moreover, defense counsel lack
any credible threat against a prosecutor who does not agree to a lenient
disposition. Because the regular criminal process is always available as
a relatively uncomplicated and expedient way to dispose of the case,
the German prosecutor will rarely "sell the court" to a defendant simply to get a case off the docket. Finally, prosecutorial sanctioning policy, which often is prescribed by informal office guidelines, allows the
individual prosecutor little leeway in which to bargain.
C. The Trial Court
A German trial court can consist of a single professional judge,
one professional and two lay judges, 1" or a panel of three professional
and two lay judges.'
Each judge, lay or professional, has an equal
104. See Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, supra note 80, at 224; Weigend, Continental Cures,supra note 81, at 415-18.
105. The overwhelming majority of German legal writers have rejected the introduction
of party negotiations in the sentencing process as unethical. See Hirsch, Zur Behandlungder
Bagatellkriminalitatin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 92 ZSTW 218, 229 (1980); Hanack,
Das Legalitatsprinzp und die Strafrechtsreform, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR WILHELM GALLAS

ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 339, 350-51 (K. Lackner, H. Leferenz, E. Schmidt, J. Welp & E.
Wolff eds. 1973); Schmidhauser, Freikaufrerfahren mit Strafcharakterim Strafprozess? 28
JZ 529, 533-34 (1973). But see Schmidt-Hieber, Vereinbarungenim Strafverfahren, 35 NJW
1017 (1982) (favoring "agreements" in the sentencing process); Schitnemann, Summum ius
summa iniuria in der Strafzumessung, in PONOMETRIE: RATIONALITAT ODER IRRATION-

74 (1977).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 77-80.
107. Lay judges are selected from the population at large by representatives of the local
parliament in a semi-political process and serve four year terms. They represent a crosssection of the local community, as do their American counterparts. For two excellent accounts of the 'selection and role of German lay judges, see generally Langbein, Mixed Court
andJury Court. Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 A.B.F.R.J.
195 and Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German CriminalCourts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135
(1972).
108. Criminal courts of first instance exist at the County Court (Amtsgericht), District
Court (Landgericht),and State Appellate Court (Oberlandesgericht)level. The bulk of cases
are tried in County Court, either by a single judge (Strafrichter)or by a panel consisting of
one (or two) professional judges and two lay judges (Sch,3ffengericht). The prosecutor has
the choice to file the accusation with either the Strafrichter or the Schaffengericht; he shall
bring before the Strafrichter only cases in which a punishment of not more than one year
imprisonment is to be expected. GERICHTSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ [GVG] § 25111. District
ALITAT DER STRAFZUMESSUNG
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vote.' 9 Generally, the serious offenses, or Verbrechen, are tried before
mixed courts; the single-judge court has jurisdiction over the Vergehen,
including those disposed of by penal orders. The single judge and the
small mixed panel may not impose a sentence of more than three years
imprisonment. "' This restriction reserves only the most serious crimes

for the large panels as few offenses in Germany are punished by more
than three years imprisonment. If it turns out, in the course of the trial,
that the case requires a more severe sentence than anticipated, the single judge or small mixed panel must refer it to a large panel."'
German observers agree that some element of discretion is involved in judicial determination of a sentence, although the nature and
the limits of judicial sentencing discretion are far from clear.11 2 The
debate about discretion may be called typically German: it is entirely
academic but it is conducted nonetheless with great intensity and intellectual vigor. The central question is whether there is, in each case, one
optimal sentence which can be "found" by correctly applying the
law,'1 3 or whether the law allows the sentencing court a range within
which any sentence is "correct" or "legal.""' 4 Everyone agrees, however, that in practice the court must retain some room for responsible
creation of a sentence because, for obvious epistemological reasons, the
Court panels of three professional and two lay judges (Grosse Strakammer) are competent
to try the 23 most serious offenses (which are listed in GVG § 7411), certain cases of political
and economic crime, and all other cases that the prosecutor presents because they are particularly important or because a sentence of more than three years imprisonment is expected.
State Appellate Courts, sitting in panels of three professional judges, try cases of treason,
genocide, and a number of offenses directed against the state.
109. GVG § 30.
110. GVG § 2411. If the prosecutor decides that a more severe sentence is appropriate, he
must file an accusation with the large mixed panel of three professional and two lay judges.
Id
111. STPO § 741.
112. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.2; Dreher, supra note 58, at 161; H.
JESCHECK, LEHRBUCHI DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 699 (3d ed. 1978); R.
MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note 72, at 477; H. BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT 87-96 (2d

ed. 1974).
113. See R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note 72, at 477; H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at
704-05; Bruns, Ale Grundfragen und neue Entwicklungstendenzen im modern en Strafzuessungsrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS WELZEL ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 739, 740-42 (G.

Stratenwerth, et al eds. 1974); Frisch, Ermessen, unbestimmer Begri#' und "Beurteilungsspielraum" im Strafrecht, 26 NJW 1345 (1973). A strong belief in the principle of Rechtsanwendung, or application of the law, is the touchstone of this group.
114. 7 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 28, 32 (1954);

LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.23; Roxin, Strafzumessung im Lichte der
Strafzwecke, in LEBENDIGES STRAFRECHT 466-69 (H. Walder & S. Trechsel eds. 1977); 1 H.
RUDOLPHi, E. HORN & E. SAMSON, SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR ZUM
STRAFGESETZBUCH § 46 n.49 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as E. HORN, SYSTEMATISCHER
KOMMENTAR]; Schaffstein, Spielraum-Theorie, Schuldbegrff und Strafzumessung nach den

1983l

SENTENCING IN WEST GERMANY

"correct" sentence remains an elusive ideal. Under neither theory, of
course, may a judge's personal 5prejudices, ideologies, or caprice influence the sentencing decision."
As the court's deliberations are secret, relatively little is known
about the influence of lay judges on sentences. One study found evidence that professional judges sometimes compromise with lay judges.
In 6.1% of their cases, dissenting lay judges affected the eventual sen11 6
tence, more often than not by voting for a more lenient disposition.
D. CorrectionalCourts and the Executive
Although the German Penal Code has long adhered to the idea of
determinate sentencing of adult offenders," 7 the Code has provided for
parole and pardon since its inception in 1871. Today, special correc-

tional courts, or Strafvollstreckungskammern, staffed solely by professional judges," I are responsible for granting and revoking parole, and
for hearing prisoners' complaints against correctional authorities." I9
The trial courts, which determined early releases before 1975, had been

criticized as too far removed from correctional reality.' 20 Meaningful
parole decisions were difficult because the composition of the trial court
often had changed since the original trial, or the judges simply could
not remember the defendant.
The correctional court is designed to ensure that parole policies
are more consistently and more rationally enforced.12 1 It is located at or
Strafrechtsreformgeselzen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR WILHELM GALLAS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG
107-08 (K. Lackner, H. Leferenz, E. Schmidt, J. Welp & E. Wolff eds. 1973).
This leeway is known as the "Spielraum," or margin. See infra text accompanying
/
notes 198-200.
115. Reliable empirical research on this subject is rare, but one study working with hypothetical cases found that "authoritarian" and "liberal" judges do not differ significantly in
their sentencing policies. K. Opp. & R. PEUCKERT, IDEOLOGIE UND FAKTEN IN DER RECHITSPRECHUNG:

EINE SOZIOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG UBER DAS URTEIL IM STRAFPROZESS

52-53 (1971).
116. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 107, at 189-90.
117. Juvenile courts, however, may impose indeterminate sentences with a statutory four-

year maximum. JUGENDGERICHTSGESETZ § 19. But juvenile courts rarely impose such
sentences: in 1974, defendants in only 3.4% of all juvenile cases received an indeterminate
sentence; in 1978, that figure dropped to 2.2%. STATISTISCHEs BUNDESAMT, AUSGEWAHLTE
ZAHLEN FOR DIE RECHTSPFLEGE

1975 30 (1977);

STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT,

Aus-

GEWAHLTE ZAHLEN FOR DIE RECHTSPFLEGE 1978 32 (1980).
118. The correctional court consists of a single professional judge in cases of imprisonment of two years or less, and three judges if the prison term is longer. GVG § 78.

119.
120.
361-62
121.
tence.

GVG § 78ai.
See, e.g., Blau, Das Vollstreckungsgericht, in STRAFVOLLZUG IN DER PRAxIs 359,
(H. Schwind & G. Blau eds. 1976).
A prisoner is generally eligible for parole when he has served two thirds of his senHe shall be released "when the likelihood that the prisoner will not commit any
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near a correctional institution and decides all cases arising in one
prison, thus gaining close familiarity with the possibilities and limita-

tions of treatment in that institution. 2 2 Although individual rehabilitative needs are generally understood to be the controlling criteria in

parole decisions, judges sometimes are subject to pressure to use parole
powers to control prison populations. For example, the Hesse Ministry
of Justice recently issued guidelines requesting correctional courts to
make more liberal use of early parole123in order to reduce the overflow of
prisoners in that state's institutions.
Although parole proposals such as the Hesse guidelines raise
doubts about the propriety of executive interference in what is consid-

ered a judicial determination, the government's pardon power offers a
legitimate alternative. 24 The right to pardon an offender usually belongs to the prime minister of the state in which the offender was convicted, and is regulated by statute or executive order. A pardon is an

act of grace, not a legal remedy. Consequently, the denial of pardon by
the executive cannot be challenged in court. 2 '

III.

THE PROCESS OF SENTENCING

Procedures and institutions for judicial sentencing in America and
Germany differ markedly. Trials and sentencing hearings are kept separate inAmerica; in Germany they are unified. Except for a handful of
jurisdictions having sentencing guidelines or a determinate sentencing
law, 126 most American courts lack criteria for sentencing. In Ger-

many's offense-oriented system, judicial discretion is restricted by
offenses justifies the risk." In making its decision, the correctional court is to take into account the circumstances of the offense as well as the prisoner's character, prior life, conduct
in prison, personal situation, and the effects that early release may have on him. STGB § 57.
In exceptional cases, parole can be granted after one half of the sentence has been
served. In 1979, 30% of all prisoners including juveniles released from prison were paroled;
only 1%of this group were released before they had served less than two thirds of the sentence. F. DUNKEL & A. ROSNER, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES STRAFVOLLZUGS IN DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND SEIT 1970 75, 77 (1981).
122. H. MULLER-DIETZ, STRAFVOLLZUGSRECHT 221-23 (2d ed. 1978).

123. See Deutscher Richterbund, Gegen landesrechdliche Richilinien zur Strafausseizung
aufBewahrung, 58 DRZ 232 (1980).
124. Because the Code until recently prohibited parole of prisoners serving life sentences,
only a pardon could open prison doors for a "lifer." Few offenders serving terms of life
imprisonment were pardoned before having served 20 years. R. MAURACH,
STRAFRECHT, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 806 (4th ed. 1971).

DEUTSCHES

125. 25 BVerfG 352, 358 (1969). The denial of parole can be appealed to the State Appellate Court.

126. See, e.g.,

MARYLAND SENTENCING GUIDELINES PROJECT, MARYLAND SENTENCING

GUIDELINES MANUAL (1981); Comment, CriminalProcedure -

Sentencing Act, 60 N.C.L. REV. 632 (1982); see also supra note 5.
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strong statutory presumptions in favor of fines over imprisonment and
the suspension of short terms of imprisonment. American judges seldom need give reasons for their decisions. German judges must account for their decisions both orally and in writing. Appellate sentence
review is rare and ineffectual in America, but pervasive and intrusive in
Germany.
A.

The Conduct of the Trial

In the United States, the rules governing trials differ greatly from
those controlling sentencing hearings. The law of evidence limits considerably the nature and sources of information that may be considered
during the guilt phase of a trial, but it imposes few limits at the time of
sentencing. The prohibition against evidence about the offender's prior
criminality, for example, dissolves once the defendant is convicted.
The court is thus relatively unencumbered, and the defendant unprotected, by evidentiary or other rules during the sentencing phase.
The guilt-finding and sentencing functions are not separated under
German law: the trial court finds the facts, decides upon the verdict, and determines the sentence, all in one proceeding - the
Hauptverhandlung (literally: main hearing). Consequently, German
law does not distinguish between evidence admissible on the issue of
guilt and other evidence, as in America, admissible only in connection
with sentencing. The trial court must gather simultaneously the information necessary to reach a verdict and to arrive at an appropriate
sentence.
The court collects evidence relevant to sentencing according to the
same standards that it follows in taking proof on the issue of guilt standards which must appear comparatively loose to the American observer. For example, hearsay evidence may be introduced and the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is limited by statute to extreme
cases, such as the use of deception, illegal threats, and hypnosis.' 27 Evi127. STPO § 136a. This section also prohibits use of evidence obtained by the use of
physical abuse, drugs, or torture. Id See also 19 BGHSt 325 (use of personal diary prohibited); 14 BGHSt 358 (1960) (tape recording of private conversation inadmissible); see generaly Weigend, Continental Cures, supra note 81, at 397-99 (discussing exclusion of illegal

evidence).
Although exclusion of evidence does exist under German law, its focus is not on
deterrence of police misconduct as in the United States, especially after United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Rather, the test for exclusion is whether use of the
evidence in court will violate the defendant's constitutional rights as counterbalanced by the
state's interest in enforcement of the law. See, e.g., 19 BGHSt 325 (1964); 44 BVerfG 353

(1977). Why Germans do not feel the same need as Americans to control their police by
procedural devices is a problem yet unsolved. See Weigend, Continental Cures,supra note
81, at 397-399.
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dence concerning the defendant's character, including prior convictions, also can be introduced even if the defendant refuses to testify.
There is no prescribed sequence in which evidence relating to guilt and
sentencing must be presented: the court is not precluded from hearing
character evidence first and evidence concerning the details of the offense later. Although the Code of Criminal Procedure recommends
that evidence of prior offenses be introduced only "as far as necessary,"' 12 1 in practice the defendant's rap sheet is usually read into the
record at the very end of the trial before the closing arguments.
At first glance, many American lawyers would regard German
procedures as unfair to defendants. A court that considers evidence
about the defendant's character, including his prior record, may be
prejudiced against him. Germans, however, generally do not regard
the unified trial and its unstructured mode of gathering evidence as
unjust.
German confidence in the fairness of its procedures derives from
two sources: the absence of an unsupervised lay fact-finder and a heritage of inquisitorial procedure, which together result in a different approach to truth-seeking. First, the German court system, unlike the
American, does not have to control the deliberations of lay jurors
through complicated rules of evidence. 129 German lay judges deliberate and decide cases together with their professional colleagues and are
under the latter's continual guidance and advice. The German system
relies on the professional judge's ability to explain the relevance and
the weight of the evidence to the lay judges to prevent them from confounding the issues. Professional judges, due to their training and experience, are presumed to know how properly to assess evidence
without the guidance of formal rules.
Second, Germany has a long history of inquisitorial procedures.
For more than three centuries it was the task of the court to investigate
the case, pronounce the verdict, and impose the sentence. 3 0 Although
the investigatory functions were transferred to the public prosecutor in
the Nineteenth Century, separate adjudication of guilt and sentencing
has been unknown at least since the end of the Middle Ages. 3 '
Germany's inquisitorial heritage has given rise to a mode of truth128. STPO § 2431V.
129. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining,supra note 80, at 207.
130. The Constitutio Criminalis Carolina of 1532, which set forth these requirements, was
in force in Germany for more than three centuries. An English translation of the provisions
of the Carolina dealing with criminal procedure can be found in J.LANGBEIN, PROSECuTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 259-308 (1974).
131. H. HENKEL, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 36, 50 (2d ed. 1968). See infra text accompanying notes 141-144 & 261.
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seeking different from that in a common-law system. In America, the
truth emerges in an indirect fashion from a contest between the parties.
Thus, the procedural rules that guide and regulate that contest are of
paramount importance.' 3 2 In Germany, however, the court seeks the
truth directly by questioning those who are most likely to know it.
While that does not mean that the truth can be sought at any Cost, 133
the German system puts less emphasis on formality and rules of evidence and looks in a less inhibited fashion to the desired end result:
the emergence of the truth. 134 A German judge would think it absurd
to limit testimony from a witness who is about to convey useful information on the defendant's need for rehabilitation because the witness
was called to testify about the offense. The loss of "truth" would be
regarded as much more harmful than any disturbance in the intended
sequence of taking proof.
One might expect German courts to be awash with evidence pertaining not to the crime but to the offender. Yet a look at German trial
practice shows that this is not the case. In the average case, no
presentence report is prepared, 13 5 and judges often limit their attention
to the defendant's prior record and his monthly income (if a day fine is
to be imposed), refraining from obtaining more detailed information
on his personal situation and history. 136 One study found that independent evidence concerning the appropriate sanction was presented
in only six percent of all criminal trials,'37 and that discussion of issues
related to sentencing in open court takes no more than five minutes in
39
the average trial, 138 which usually lasts less than an hour.
German courts thus treat sentencing as subsidiary to the overriding concern in the information-gathering phase of adjudication: the
determination of guilt or innocence. Critics committed to the rehabili132. Damaska, Die Stellung des Verteidigers im amerikanischen Strafprozess, 90 ZSTW

829, 842-43 (1978).
133. 14 BGHSt 358, 365 (1960); K. PETERS, supra note 78, at 77-78.
134. See C. RoxIN, STRAFVERFAHRENSRECHT 70 (15th ed. 1979).

135. The German Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the prosecutor to delegate the
collection of sentence-related evidence to a special agency known as Gerichtshilfe, or "Court

Aid," STPO § 160111, but not all of the states have created such agencies. Where they exist,
lack of manpower often limits their activities to the most difficult and extraordinary cases.
C. ROXIN, supra note 134, at 53; St~ckel, Der Sozialdienst in der Jusiiz, in FESTSCHRiFT FOR
HANS-JORGEN BRUNS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 299, 301-03 (W. Frisch & W. Schmid eds.

1978).
136. D. DLLING, supra note 96, at 194; see also H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 79-8 1.
137. D. DOLLING, supra note 96, at 189.
138, Id. at 179.

139. The average trial in Germany takes only 50 to 60 minutes. Id at 219; Weigend,
Continental Cures, supra note 81, at 411.
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tative ideal have regarded that one-sided emphasis as inadequate. 40
The great majority of German legal writers in the last decade have
called for the introduction of a two-phase proceeding patterned after
the Anglo-American model.' 4 ' They argue that the split trial permits
more detailed consideration of the accused's personality and mitigating
and aggravating circumstances, and that it may reduce the likelihood
that evidence germane to sentencing will influence adjudication on the
merits. Moreover, the two-phase trial would free defense counsel from
his present summing-up dilemma: counsel in one final statement must
both assert the defendant's innocence and explain why he deserves a
lenient sentence if found guilty.
The split trial exists today primarily in the pages of academic journals. No enabling legislation has been passed, but the Code of Criminal Procedure does not explicitly prohibit informal separation of
hearings on the issues of guilt and sentence. One jurisdiction tested the
concept and an evaluation of this experience demonstrated that the
split trial is a feasible alternative in that it does not create insurmountable procedural problems. Although the sentences imposed did not differ significantly from those handed down in traditional trials, 4 2 the
average time devoted to receiving evidence concerning the sanction increased from five minutes to ten minutes. 43 The minimal increase in
time suggests the strength as well as the weakness of the proposal: legal
scholars welcome the more intensive exploration of factors relevant to
sentencing, but practitioners may be wary of any change that increases
overall trial time. '41
B.

The Court's Deliberations

Little is known about the next phase of sentencing, the internal
deliberations of the court. Legal scholars argue that consideration of
the appropriate sentence should consist of at least two stages: first, setting a sentence that reflects the offender's culpability; second, correcting
140. J. HERRMANN, DIE REFORM DER DEUTSCHEN

HAUPTVERHANDLUNG NACH DEM
139-41 (1971); Dahs, Forschril-

VORBILD DES ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHEN STRAFVERFAHRENS

tiches Strafrecht in rckstandingem Strafverfahren, 23 NJW 1705, 1705 (1970); Jescheck, Der
Strafprozess - Aktuelles und Zeitloses, 25 JZ 201, 206 (1970); Blau, Die Teilung des
Strafverfahrens in zwei Abschnitte: Schuldspruch und Strafausspruch, 81 ZSTW 31, 33-35

(1969).
141.
142.
143.
144.

See, e.g., C. ROXIN, supra note 134, at 234-35; D. D6LLING, supra note 96, at 2 n.2.
D. DOLLING, supra note 96, at 204.
D. DbLLING, supra note 96, at 178.
Proponents of the split trial still differ about specifics such as the allocation of the

issue of insanity, and the binding character of the judicial determination of guilt marking
the end of the first phase. Legislative reform, therefore, if it comes at all, will come slowly.
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it for his rehabilitative needs; and possibly further adjusting it to satisfy
the demands of general deterrence.' 4 5 It is not likely that many panels
actually undertake these complicated mental operations. A court needs
a two-thirds majority to impose any sentence other than the legal mini47
mum, 14 6 and usually hands down sentences in round numbers.
These factors suggest that other, non-doctrinal considerations frequently influence the deliberative process: a court, for example, may
compromise to accommodate differing sentencing philosophies among
the panel. A court also may give undue weight to practical considerations as when it sets a sentence of probation instead of a fine in order to
allow supervision by a probation officer. 148
The German Penal Code constrains the court's deliberations, not
only by setting sentence ranges for individual offenses, but also by providing statutory preferences for certain types and degrees of sanctions.
The authorized sanctions for most offenses before German courts are
either imprisonment, probation, or a fine. The German Penal Code
views imprisonment only as a last resort, stating a clear preference for
day fines in offenses of lesser or medium seriousness.149 Section 47 of
the Code, part of an international trend against short-term imprisonment, permits the court to impose prison sentences of up to six months
only "if special circumstances regarding the offense or the personality
of the offender make imprisonment indispensable to influence the offender or to protect the legal order."' ° Barring special circumstances,
the court must suspend prison sentences of one year or less if it expects
5
that the defendant will not commit additional offenses.' '
In practice, the courts largely honor the legislative policy against
145. K.

LACKNER, fiBER NEUE ENTWICKLUNGEN IN DER STRAFZUMESSUNGSLEHRE UND

IHRE BEDEUTUNG FOR DIE RICHTERLICHE PRAXIS 12-13 (1978);

R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF,

supra note 72, at 448.
146. STPO § 2631.
147. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 76; Hassemer, supra note 54, 78-79; K. ROLINSKI,
DIE PRAGNANZTENDENZ IM STRAFURTEIL 105 (1969). Defendants usually receive sentences

such as one year, two years, three years imprisonment, or 20 or 30 day fines, and not one
year and seven months, or 38 day fines, as could be expected given Germany's complicated
sentencing system.
148. Hassemer, supra note 54, at 80.
149. STGB § 471; see Griinwald, Offene Fragen im System der Hauptstrafen, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR FRIEDRICH SCHAFFSTEIN 219, 221 (G.Grinwald, 0. Miehe, H. Rudolphi & H.
Schreiber eds. 1975).
It is impermissible to sentence an offender to a prison term because the court thinks
that he will be unable to pay a fine. The day fine system makes it possible to adapt the fine
to the offender's financial means. SCHONKE & SCHR6DER, supra note 72, § 46 n.61. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
150. STGB § 471. The statute does not define the term "special circumstances."
151. STGB § 56.
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terms of imprisonment for less serious offenses. First offenders usually
receive fines, and prison sentences are generally reserved for repeat offenders. 5 2 Recidivism is the paradigmatic "special circumstance"
which permits the imposition of a prison term;153 age or economic status does not influence an offender's chance of being sent to prison.' 54
The criminal career of the typical recidivist, especially one who continues to repeat the same crime, is almost uniformly mirrored by advancement on the rungs of the sentence ladder: first a fine, then probation,
and finally a prison sentence. One may doubt the wisdom of this escalation from the least to the most dissocializing sanction, 1 55 in which the
state beats the drum to the offender's march to the point of no return,
but German courts adhere to this sentencing philosophy.'5 6
C. Imposition of Sentence
Once the court has decided upon a verdict and a sentence, it resumes the public session and pronounces the judgment.' 57 The presiding judge states in court the reasons for both the verdict and the
152. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 98-101.

153. Id at 99; SCHONKE & SCHRODER, supra note 72, § 47 n.ll.
Americans also accept the enhancement of punishment for recidivists without hesitation. While an increase in severity is consistent with the rehabilitative spirit of the Model
Penal Code, see, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 7.01(2)(g), 7.03(1) (Proposed Official Draft
1962), the practice must be justified in a system based on desert, such as California's, see
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666, 667.5 (West 1980), or the sentencing scheme devised by the Committee for the Study of Incarceration, see generaly A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976);
G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 464-66 (1978). See infra note 265.
Under German law, recidivists are treated more severely, but the enhancement of
the sentence is low compared to some American statutes: an offender who is convicted for
the third time and who has previously spent at least three months in prison must be sentenced to a minimum period of six months imprisonment. STGB § 48. In a feeble attempt
to conform this provision to the desert principle, the statute requires that the offense be such
that the offender can justly be blamed with failing to heed the warning of the earlier conviction. ld No provision, however, increases an offender's term beyond the maximum.
154. J. SCHIEL, UNTERSCHIEDE IN DER DEUTSCHEN STRAFRECHTSPRECHUNG 45-46
(1969); see H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 160, 170. See infra text accompanying notes
238-244.
155. G. STRATENWERTH, TATSCHULD UND STRAFZUMESSUNG 16-19 (Recht und Staat in
Geschichte und Gregenwart No. 406/407, 1972).
156. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 99.
157. In a typical case, the judgment might read: "Defendant Mller is sentenced to nine
months imprisonment for aggravated larceny. The execution of the sentence is suspended."
See J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 55 (1977).
A defendant convicted of more than one offense receives only one sentence. If he
violated two or more provisions of the Code by committing a single act, e.g., by killing the
victim in an act of rape, he is sentenced only for the more serious offense. STGB § 52. If,
however, he committed two or more independent criminal acts, the court determines the
appropriate sentence for each offense, adds the two, and deducts a discretionary "bonus."
STGB §§ 53, 54.
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sentence, as required by statute.' 5 8 The explanation, even in minor
cases, takes an average of four minutes.' Judges regard it as important that the parties, especially the defendant, understand how the
court evaluated the evidence and why it chose a particular sentence.
Although judges often try to make the oral statement as comprehensive
as possible, it has little legal significance: the statement is not recorded,
nor is it subject to review. 60 The court also must prepare an extensive
written statement of the reasons for the verdict, as well as for the sen61
tence, within five weeks after the pronouncement of the judgment.'
This statement contains the official justification for the deprivation of
liberty or property imposed upon the defendant and is subject
to close
62
scrutiny by the higher court if either party files an appeal.1
The written statement ideally should include a description of the
defendant's personality, an extensive discussion of sentencing alternatives available for the offender, and a persuasive statement of the considerations that moved the court to select the particular sentence. But
practice often falls short of the ideal. Critics complain that some judges
do no more than recite a common formula, such as "with respect to the
nature of the offense and to the personality of the offender, the sentence
imposed was necessary and sufficient,"'163 or that judges simply enumerate sentencing factors with no attempt to relate them to the actual
sentence. 1'I Although appellate courts do not require explanations to
cover all conceivable grounds for sentencing, 65 such mechanical incantations of magic formulae certainly do not fulfill the law's aim of ensuring a reasoned sentencing decision.
Appellate courts may be to blame for taking the juice out of sentencing reasons. The higher courts have kept a tight rein on lower
courts by overturning many judgments for allegedly "illegal" sentencing considerations, 66 thus driving the true reasons 67 underground and
158. STPO § 26811.
159. D. D6LLING, supra note 96, at 230. See supra note 139.

160. 7 BGHSt 363, 370-71 (1955).
161. STPO §§ 267, 275.
162. If both parties waive their right to appeal, the written judgment can be filed in an
abridged form. STPO § 267.
163. Seebald, supra note 54, at 8; see also H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at 137 ("'sufficient

and necessary' or 'proper and requisite'

").

164. Lorenz, May & Schubert, Strafzumessung beim Bankraub, 51 DRZ 193, 195 (1973).
165. See 24 BGHSt 268 (1971); Otto, Mig/ichkeiten und Grenzen der Revision in Strafsachen, 31 NJW 1, 10 (1978).

166. Judgments of trial courts may be "illegal," and therefore subject to reversal, because
of "irrelevant" considerations in sentencing. See, e.g, H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at 360-61

(the trial court considered that the offender would be expelled from the civil service if given
a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year); 40 Verkehrsrechtssammlung 418 (Fed.
App. Ct. 1971) (the court, in a trial involving reckless killing with an automobile, had held it
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encouraging trial courts to rely on meaningless formulae. 168 An additional reason for the frequency of unsatisfactory explanations is the
lack of dissenting opinions at the trial level.' 6 9 The court's written
statement often explains a compromise disposition, perhaps one with
which the author disagrees. 170 Yet, although the German sentencing
process falls short of fulfilling its promise of open reasoning and rationality, it may be preferable to a system where
the defendant need not be
7
given any explanation for his sentence.' '
D. Appeal of Sentence

German law liberally grants both the defendant and the prosecutor the right to seek review of a criminal judgment.172 Either party may
appeal a decision of a local court, or Amtsgericht, which consists of
either a single professional judge or one professional and two lay
judges, without alleging specific reasons and demand a trial de novo in
the district court, or Landgericht. This appeal, called a Berufung, usually attacks both the verdict and the sentence, but the defendant can
limit the appeal to the sentence only if he concedes guilt but considers
the sentence disproportionately severe. 73 If only the defendant apagainst the defendant that he had not expressed his regrets to the widow of the deceased);
1980 Juristische Rundschau 76 (St. App. Ct. 1979) (the court considered the young age of the
victim as an aggravating factor in an automobile manslaughter case).
167. There is a saying among German lawyers that for each judgment there are three sets
of reasons: the oral reasons, the written reasons, and the real reasons.
168. Hassemer, supra note 54, at 80-82.
169. Only judges on the Bundesverfassungsgericht, or Federal Constitutional Court, can
dissent. This court has published dissenting opinions since 1971.
170. Hassemer, supra note 54, at 89. Only the presiding judge or one of the other professional judges can write the trial court's opinion. Id
171. See Note, Disparity and Discretion in Sentencing: A Proposalfor Uniformity, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323 (1977) (arguing for enunciation of sentencing reasons by trial courts).
In Maryland, a sentence is generally not reviewable if within statutory limits unless
the sentencing determination rests on an impermissible consideration, Johnson v. State, 274
Md. 536, 538, 336 A.2d 113, 114 (1975), denies the defendant due process of law in violation
of the fourteenth amendment, William v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 242-52 (1949), or is
otherwise constitutionally infirm. See generally Note, Toward a Probable Cause Standardin
Sentencing: Nickens v. State, 34 MD. L. REV. 133 (1974) (use of hearsay at sentencing
stage); Note, Sentencing, 36 MD. L. REV. 454 (1976) (consideration in sentencing of related
crimes of which defendant was acquitted); Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure,
74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964) (review of criminal sentences in federal appellate courts).
172. The American reader may be surprised that the German prosecutor can appeal from
a verdict of acquittal. While the general principle of double jeopardy is recognized in German law, see GG art. 103(3), it is limited to multiple prosecutions for the same act. The
original prosecution is thought to end only when there is a final judgment, i.e., a judgment
from which no appeal can be taken.
173. STPO § 318.

19831

SENTENCING IN WEST GERMANY

peals a judgment of the local court, the sentence cannot be increased. 174
All judgments of the district court, including appeals from local courts,
may be appealed as a matter of right to an appellate court. Appeals in
cases originally tried in the local court are heard by the State Appellate
Court, or Oberlandesgericht; cases started at the district court level
must be appealed to the Federal Appellate Court, or Bundesgerichishof.
At this level, the appellant must allege specific procedural or substantive mistakes by the district court as evidenced in the record and, in
particular, the written judgment.
During the first few decades following the introduction of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, appellate courts seldom overruled sentencing decisions. The courts regarded sentencing as based on the facts
of the case, not the law, and therefore outside the purview of appellate
review. Sentencing in their view was a matter of the trial court's unreviewable discretion, particularly because sentences are based in part on
the impression an offender makes on the court - a factor which cannot
75
be reproduced in the record or in the written judgment.
These arguments did not prevent a gradual broadening of the
scope of appellate sentence review. Since 1945, Germans have regarded the idea of uncontrolled discretion at any level of any governmental branch as irreconcilable with the principles of democracy and
the rule of law.' 76 The movement toward strict application of legal
standards in decisions affecting the individual citizen, carried forward
by courts and scholars alike, soon reached the area of sentencing. In an
important 1962 decision, the Federal Appellate Court emphasized the
trial court's primary responsibility in sentencing, but announced that it
would overturn sentences if the trial court's reasons for the sentence
were legally improper, if the trial court had failed to consider one of the
recognized purposes of punishment, or if there was a strong dispropor1 77
tionality between the offender's culpability and the punishment.
Today, appellate courts still pay lip service to the trial court's sentencing discretion, 7 8 but have set narrow limits on its exercise. At one
time only blatant blunders in the lower court's sentence reasons led to
reversal,' 79 but no longer. Appellate courts increasingly tend to weigh
174. STPO § 331.
175. See H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at 651-53, 663-65; W. FRISCH, REVISIONSRECHTLICHE
PROBLEME DER STRAFZUMESSNG 63-109 (1971).

176. See GG art. 28.
177. 17 BGHSt 35, 36-37 (1962).
178. See, e.g., 27 BGHSt 2, 3-4 (1976).
179. Appellate courts reversed trial courts that incorrectly cited aggravating factors in
mitigation, failed to consider the personality of the offender, explicitly went beyond the punishment proportionate to the culpability of the offender for purposes of general deterrence,
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the overall fairness of the sentence and do not hesitate to order resentencing if they deem the sanction imposed either too severe or too
light. 8' Insufficient reasoning in the lower court's opinion is usually
the technical grounds invoked for reversal. The wider the gap is between the actual disposition and the "normal" sentence, the heavier the
burden of justification will be on the district court.' 8' Appellate judges
take their standards of "normal" not from a body of formal law, but
from their own feeling of equity and justice and from their experience
with the sentencing policies of other trial courts. 18 2 Thus, although defendants cannot successfully base their appeals on more lenient treatment received by other defendants under similar circumstances, 83 the
equality of sentences in comparable cases is furthered by the controlling influence of appellate courts.

IV.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING

German sentencing principles can be approached in several ways.
A reader might explore the jurisprudential rhetoric of sentencing, consult the criminal statutes to learn what guidance the legislature has

given the courts, or study how courts in practice handle the recurring
practical problems of sentencing. This section discusses German sentencing from these three perspectives and in this order.
A.

Jurisprudence

German jurisprudence since 1945 has recognized retribution as the
primary justification and purpose of punishment. Retribution gained
or, contrary to STGB § 46111, cited constituent elements of the offense as aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. See LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.125.
180. Two examples of sentences reversed for undue leniency:
In one case, the defendants had tried several times to destroy a police station with
home-made bombs. The bombs finally exploded, but the station sustained little damage due
to the defendants' poor craftsmanship. Despite prior records, the district court sentenced
each defendant to only four months imprisonment and granted probation. See 30
MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHEs RECHT [MDR] 941 (Fed. App. Ct. 1976).
In another case, the defendants had solicited young people to join a criminal gang
which committed politically motivated terrorist acts, including bombings. The defendants
did not have prior records. They stated that they did not regret their criminal activities. The
district court sentenced one to six months imprisonment and granted probation; the other
received a fine of approximately $2000. See 31 NJW 174 (Fed. App. Ct. 1977).
181. Mosl, Tendenzen der Slrafzumessung in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichzshofs,
57 DRZ 165, 166 (1979); LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.126; H. SCH6CH,
STRAFZUMESSuNGSPRAXiS UND VERKEHRSDELINQUENZ 27 (1973); 31 MDR 106 (Fed. App.

Ct. 1976).
182. See H. BRUNS, LEITFADEN DES STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHTS 282-84 (1980).
183. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.28; H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at

700.
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additional favor after the abuses of the Nazi regime, which had emphasized deterrence in sentencing, had demonstrated the dangers of deviation from the idea of strict proportionality between culpability and
punishment. 84 Rehabilitation, general deterrence, and incapacitation
are only of secondary importance.
1. Culpability and Desert - The foundation principles of modem
German sentencing theory are that punishment requires culpability
and that the primary purpose of punishment is retribution for the offender's culpable act.' 85 A modem secular system of sanctions cannot
be based on a metaphysical notion of subjective responsibility, to be
established only by theforum internum. Rather, the desert principle that the offender's culpability in committing an act should determine
the sanction - is related to the modem state's task of safeguarding
social peace and order. 8 6 If punishment is to restore the social peace
disturbed by the offense, the penalty must be such that everyone affected - the victim, the offender, and society at large - can accept it
as a commensurate, fair, and sufficient response to the wrongful act.
Otherwise, punishment becomes socially counterproductive. Let it be
too strict and the offender and his sympathizers will be resentful. Let it
be too lenient and the victim and his friends will remain dissatisfied.
Thus, rather than restoring social peace, potential sources of conflict
may be created.
The exact boundaries of culpability are far from clear. The concept includes more than blameworthiness, which is one prerequisite of
a finding of guilt and can be defined as the internal connection between
the offender and his act. 187 All circumstances related to the social impact of an offense - including the nature of the offense, the offender's
motivation, the degree of his deviation from generally approved standards of conduct, and the extent of damage caused or intended - constitute elements of culpability. Some writers contend that an
assessment of culpability also requires consideration of the defendant's
character, his general law abidance as demonstrated by his behavior
184. See Bruns, "Stellenwerttheorie" oder "Doppelspurige Straqhhenbemessung"?, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR EDUARD DREHER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 252 (H. Jescheck & H. Luttger
eds. 1977).
185. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n. 13; Herrmann, Sanctions, supra note

27, at 719-20 (1976); see also Jescheck, supra note 112, at 701.
186. Roxin, supra note 114, at 468.

187. Roxin, Zur fngsten Diskussion Ober Schuld, Pravention und Verantwordichkeit im
Strafrecht, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR PAUL BOCKELMANN ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 279, 304 (A.
Kaufmann, G. Bemmann, D. Krauss & K. Volk eds. 1979); LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra
note 59, § 46 n.6; see T. HERTZ, DAS VERHALTEN DES TATERS NACH DER TAT 64-65 (1973).
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before and after the commission of the offense, and the intensity of his
anti-social behavior. 188 Other commentators believe that only the characteristics of the offense are relevant, and would consider elements of
the offender's personality only in connection with rehabilitation.' 8 9
Under the desert principle, the offender may receive neither more
nor less punishment than he deserves. Some scholars, however, argue
that the offender's reintegration into society should be the overriding
concern of a sentencing court and that a court may fix a lesser penalty
if imposition of the deserved punishment would decrease the offender's
rehabilitative prospects. 90 But the courts refuse to deviate from the
desert principle and thus have rejected this argument. Otherwise, the
courts contend, punishment would lose its force and would degenerate
into an ethically neutral measure of prevention.' 9'
Any system relying on culpability and desert as yardsticks for sentencing is faced with a seemingly insoluble problem: Punishment, and
perhaps even culpability, can be measured quantitatively but it is
hardly possible to correlate the two. Culpability cannot easily be translated into years and months of imprisonment nor into sums of
money. 192 Such calculations, if possible at all, lack objective validity.
The German sentencing system is thus anchored in irrationality.
There is no articulable reason why the culpability of an average robber
should be worth one year in prison, and not three years, or six months.
Once that inevitably arbitrary choice has been made, however, setting
commensurate sentences can be done with some accuracy. If one year
of imprisonment is the sanction for an "average" robbery, it is quite
rational to say that the punishment for armed robbery should be somewhat more severe, perhaps eighteen months in prison, and that the
188. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.6; Bruns, supra note 113, at 752.
189. See R. MAURACH & H. ZiPF, supra note 72, at 430; G. STRATENWERTH, supra note
155, at 28-37.
190. SCH6NKE & SCHR6DER, supra note 72, § 46 n.4; R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note
72, at 449; K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 25; Roxin, supra note 114, at 476-78.
A group of liberal professors proposed a more radical solution in 1966 in an alternative draft proposal for a penal code. See supra note 10. They proposed that: "The punishment to be imposed for the offense shall not exceed that which is required in order to
reintegrate the offender into society and to protect legal interests." ALTERNATIV-ENTWURF,
supra note 7, § 59 II. Under this provision, which was rejected by the German legislature,
culpability would no longer have been the controlling factor in sentencing. Id at 52, 54.
191. 31 NJW 1974 (Fed. App. Ct. 1977); 24 BGHSt 132 (1970); H. BRUNS, supra note 112,
at 322-23. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at 18-19 & 19 n.12.
192. See Roxin, Privention und Strafzumessung, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HANS-JRGEN
BRUNS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 191 (W. Frisch & W. Schmid eds. 1978); Silving, supra note
24, at 745-49; Schoene, Die Regelstrafe."Ein Versuch zur Linderung des Unbehagens bei der
Strafzumessung, 20 NJW 1118, 1119 (1967); Ostermeyer, supra note 52, at 2302.
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punishment for attempted robbery should be less, perhaps six months.
Setting appropriate anchor values is the crux of the German sentencing
system; we shall see later what solutions courts have found to deal with
the practical aspects of this problem.
2. Rehabilitation - Rehabilitation, although regarded as coequal with retribution in theory, has never been more than a complementary purpose of punishment in practice. 9 3 German courts are precluded from prolonging or shortening a sentence in order to facilitate
the rehabilitation of the offender. Any sentence surpassing the limits
set by the desert principle is regarded as strictly impermissible. ' 94 If the
defendant needs specific treatment, the court can order measures of rehabilitation independently of and in addition to the punishment.' 95
The rehabilitative model of sentencing, rejected in Germany, does
not permit the strictly rational fixing of sentences, but for different reasons than a system based on the desert principle. Decades of experience have shown that the rehabilitative - as opposed to the
incapacitative - potential of long prison sentences is low. 196 All other
general statements about rehabilitative success remain largely speculative. Given the state of today's research into the prognosis and treatment of offenders, no responsible legal commentator or scientist can
predict a specific date for the earliest safe release of any convicted offender. '91 In light of this uncertainty the conservatism of German doctrine with respect to rehabilitative considerations in sentencing looks
progressive.
A trial court may consider the effects of punishment on the offender's chances of reintegration only within a relatively narrow range
left by the desert principle. The jurisprudence of the Federal Appellate
193. See K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 29; R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note 72, at
456.
194. 20 BGHSt 264 (1965). See supra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
195. The arrangement reeks of double punishment: the offender is sent to prison for what
he did, and then he is sent to another institution for what he might do. The offender thus
pays a heavy price for the neat doctrinal separation between culpability and dangerousness;
he will hardly be consoled by knowing that his sojourn in a mental institution, a drug treatment center, in an institution of social therapy, or in "security custody" is labelled nonpunitive. See Moller, Sanktionen iniurisrischer undsoziologischerSicht, 32 JZ 381, 382 (1977).

Since 1975, however, measures of rehabilitation and security are executed before the execution of criminal punishment, and the offender is often granted parole after serving the "nonpunitive" term. See STGB § 67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
196. G. STRATENWERTH, supra note 155, at 21.
197. Dreher, supra note 58, at 158; E. HORN, SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note
114, § 46 n.5; Bruckmann, Vorschlag zur Reform des Strafzumessungsrechts, 6 ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 30, 32 (1973); H. SCH6CH, supra note 181, at 83-84. See Hassemer,

supra note 54, at 89.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 42

Court lets rehabilitation in by a tiny back door: the epistemological
imperfection in the culpability - punishment relationship. The inability to calibrate culpability on scales of years, months, or sums of money
leaves a range of permissible sentences, known as the Spielraum, in
which a court may consider the goal of rehabilitation.' 9 8 Although
some commentators argue that this theory lacks logic and that it is far
removed from the manner in which judges actually compute
sentences,' 9 9 the Spielraum theory provides a tenable theoretical basis
for a compromise between retributive and rehabilitative
considerations. 2o
3. General Deterrence - German scholars argue heatedly about
the appropriateness of increasing sentences to warn possible offenders
of the state's readiness to react forcefully to behavior that seriously disrupts social peace. No writer advocates an increase of punishment beyond the Spielraum for reasons of general deterrence, but some would
forbid any consideration of general deterrence. They argue that it is
manifestly unfair to punish someone more severely in order to educate
others, and that too little is known about the actual deterrent effect of
increased penalties.2 ° '
German appellate courts have few scruples in regard to general
deterrence. They consistently rule that a sentencing judge acts within
the bounds of legal discretion when he considers the deterrent effect of
a sentence, especially with respect to crimes typically committed by calculating offenders, such as espionage and tax fraud.2" 2 Many courts
impose sentences approaching the upper limit of the Spielraum by in"198.

7BGHSt 28 (1954); see also LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note
59, § 46 n.21;

Roxin, supra note 192, at 184; Silving, supra note 24, at 745-49; H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at
263-77.
199. Dreher, supra note 58, at 163; K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 12-14; see H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at 704-05.

200. See Roxin, supra note 114, at 466.
201. See Hassemer, supra note 54, at 96; Roxin, supra note 192, at 196; Roxin, supra note
114, at 470-71 (arguing that any sentence based on general deterrence violates STGB § 46);
G.

WARDA,

DOGMATISCHE

GRUNDLAGEN

DES

RICHTERLICHEN

ERMESSENS

IM

STRAFRECHT 163-70 (1962); Schmidt, Vergeltung, Suhne, Spezia/pravention, 67 ZSTW 177,

193-94 (1955).
202. See, e.g., 28 BGHSt 318, 326-27 (1979); 39 MDR 812 (Fed. App. Ct. 1976).

With respect to other offenses, the Federal Appellate Court is more restrictive. In
1972, the court reversed a sentence of four years imprisonment for an attempted robbery, a
crime which has a statutory maximum sentence of five years imprisonment, committed by a
20 year-old, slightly retarded foreign soldier stationed in a German town. The lower court
had justified the extraordinarily high sentence by referring to the necessity of deterring other
foreign soldiers stationed in the same town from committing similar acts. 27 MDR 190
(1972).
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voking the need to deter possible offenders.2 °3
Some commentators who favor consideration of general deterrence take a more restrictive approach. They would permit consideration of deterrence only as a counterweight to factors that would justify
a sentence in the lower range of the Spielraum. In the case of a socially
well-integrated defendant, for example, if the court considers rehabilitation of the offender, a lesser penalty, such as a fine, might appear
more appropriate than an "average" punishment, such as imprisonment, which might disintegrate the offender's social ties. The public,
however, might interpret such a sentence as an incomprehensible and
unjustifiable surrender to crime. 2°4 The court, the argument goes,
should counterbalance the effect of a strictly offender-oriented sentence
by invoking principles of general deterrence.
The legislature has explicitly mandated that the court consider
general deterrence when making two important sentencing decisions:
First, the court should not suspend a sentence of imprisonment between six months and one year if "defense of the legal order" requires
its execution.2 °5 Second, the court should impose a prison sentence of
less than six months if necessary to maintain the legal order.20 6 Within
the Spielraum, a trial court can thus adapt the sentence to public expectations about the role of the criminal courts in maintaining law and
order. For example, the court can impose a short-term prison sentence
and deny probation if the offender acted with particular audacity or
otherwise demonstrated that he failed to take seriously the prohibitions
of the criminal law. 2 7 But even the "defense of the legal order" cannot
justify a sentence beyond the limits set by the culpability of the
offender.20 8
Too much should not be made of these legislative mandates. They
may be merely of theoretical interest because courts rarely invoke deterrence as a ground for imposing a term of imprisonment, rather than
a fine or probation. One sample of 540 judgments of lower courts, for
example, did not contain a single decision in which the necessity to
defend the legal order was cited as the reason for imposing a short
prison sentence or for denying probation.20 9
203. See Bruns, supra note 182, at 78-85; Mosl, supra note 181, at 167; Lorenz, May &
Schubert, supra note 164, at 194.
204. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.24; R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra
note 72, at 454.
205. STBG § 56111.

206.
207.
208.
209.

STGB § 471.
24 BGHSt 40, 47 (1970); Grtinwald, supra note 149, at 232.
28 BVerfG 386, 391 (1970).
H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 193.
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The lack of emphasis on deterrence in German sentencing may
surprise the American reader. Yet deterrence does not necessarily require frightening people into obedience by threatening them with exorbitant penalities. In modem German theory, deterrence is understood
as general prevention - the state's effort to back up and stabilize fundamental social norms by means of the least intrusive measures sufficient to prevent disruption of the social order.21 0 Deterrence in that
sense is a by-product of any punishment 2"' and is best achieved by
sentences that reflect the degree of the offender's culpability:21 2 The
spectacle of an offender receiving his "just deserts" reassures the public
of the state's readiness to uphold its most fundamental norms, which
include justice and respect for every fellow man's freedom and liberty.
4. Incapacitation- The goal of incapacitation plays only a minimal role in articulated sentencing decisions of German courts. Incapacitation is a by-product of a prison sentence, but may not be used to
justify an extension of a sentence beyond what the culpability of the
offender compels.2 3 A trial court may, however, impose one of the
non-punitive measures available under German law, such as "security
custody ' 21 4 or the revocation of a driver's license,21 5 which serve primarily incapacitative purposes. 216
This list of jurisprudentially approved purposes of punishment
provides only a vague guide to a trial court, yielding more prohibitions
than affirmative direction for the sentencing judge. Culpability has absolute priority as the yardstick courts must use in sentencing. This
leaves little room for consideration of rehabilitation and general
deterrence.
B. Legislation
The German legislature has given the courts little statutory guidance for sentencing decisions. The sole provision of the German Penal Code concerning the decision-making process, section 46, is a
210. See Roxin, supra note 114, at 466-67.
211. See H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at 53.
212. See id at 61. As early as 1928, the famous German jurist Eduard Kohlrausch coined
the phrase: "Urn Generaipravention braucht man sich nicht zu sorgen." (One does not have
to worry about general prevention.). E. Kohlrausch, Fortschritteund Rackschritte in den
kriminapoh'tischen Bestimmungen des neuesten Strafgesetzentwurfs, in 3 MITTEILUNGEN DER
INTERNATIONALEN KRIM1NALISTISCHEN VEREINIGUNG, NEUE FOLGE 5, 14 (1928).
213. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.18.
214. See supra note 39.
215. See supra notes 40 & 41.
216. See supra note 195.
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compromise formula which states rather than resolves the perennial
conflict between retributivists and rehabilitators: 217 "The culpability of
the offender is the basis of sentencing. The effects which the punishment is expected to have on the offender's future life in society shall be
taken into account. ' 21 Appellate courts have interpreted this vague
prescription to forbid trial courts to go outside the range of desert-oriented punishment to meet the rehabilitative needs of the offenders.
Additionally, the section provides scant guidance to judges in choosing
the proper sentence within the Spielraum.
A novel proposal for interpretation of the statutory formula recently has received attention. Under this two-step approach, culpability and rehabilitation would dominate different phases of the
sentencing process. First, the court would determine the length of the
sentence according to the offender's culpability. It then would decide
the nature of the sentence, i.e., imprisonment, probation, or day fine,
depending on the offender's rehabilitative needs. 2 9 The Code now
permits the trial court to interchange sanctions for offenses punishable
up to a maximum of a one-year sentence. Within this range, which
covers the majority of cases, the Code allows the court to send the defendant to prison, to order the prison sentence suspended, or to impose
a day fine. This proposal argues that the choice among modes of punishment, as opposed to its quantum, should be guided by criminological knowledge rather than by an assessment of culpability.
Most commentators have rejected the proposal and argue that the
mechanical allocation of sentencing considerations to different phases
of sentencing is too simple to be fair: It can be damaging to the defendant if the court determines the length of the punishment without regard
to his potential for rehabilitation, and it would likewise appear unfair
not to consider the minor seriousness of the offense when choosing
among a fine, probation, or imprisonment. 220 Nor does section 46 permit the total exclusion of rehabilitative considerations from the determination of the sentence length. The proposal also offers no solution to
217. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n. 12; T. HERTZ, supra note 187, at 11;

see G. STRATENWERTH, supra note 155, at 11.
218. STGB § 461.
219. Horn, Zum Stellenwert der "Stellenwertiheorie, " in FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS-JORGEN
BRUNS ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAGpassim (W. Frisch & W. Schmid eds. 1978); E. HORN, SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note 114, § 46 nn.21-35; Schoch, Grundlage und
Wirkungen der der Strafe: Zum Reaviatsgehalt des § 46 Abs. 1 StGB, in FESTSCHRIFT FIOR
FRIEDRICH SCHAFFSTEINpassim (G. Grtnwald, 0. Miehe, H. Rudolphi & H. Schreiber eds.
1975); H. SCH6CH, supra note 181, at 91-97.
220. SCH6NKE & SCHR6DER, supra note 72, § 46 n.4; K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at
16-22; Roxin, supra note 192, at 186-89; see Bruns, supra note 184, at 261-65.
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the problem of sentencing in serious cases where the conflict between
culpability (which here requires a long prison term) and rehabilitation
22 1
(which is often best served by noncustodial treatment) is most acute.
C.

The Courts in Practice

Sentencing courts must accept the unresolved antinomy between
statutory punishment goals.2 22 Neither section 46 nor any other provision of the German Penal Code resolves this conflict. The official list of
sentencing factors in section 46 only states indefinite criteria, such as
the offender's motive and "prior life," without ranking these factors or
specifying which circumstances should be weighed in favor of the defendant, and which against him. 22 3 But German courts, like American
ones, must sentence the defendants before them, no matter how ambiguous the formal rules may be. Perforce courts must face a number of
troubling and sometimes controversial choices.
First, may a court consider criminal acts of which the defendant
was acquitted or for which prosecution was dropped as aggravating
factors? The "prior life" clause of section 46, according to the Federal
Appellate Court22 4 and a majority of commentators,225 allows the consideration of such factors which are unrelated to the offender's culpability in committing the offense because they permit conclusions as to
the personality of the offender.
Second, can an offender be held legally responsible (schuldig) for
unforseen harm caused by his act? Some writers would exclude unforseen damage from sentencing decisions 226 and others would require at
221. One of the proponents of this theory, Professor Schoch, recently has retreated from
significant parts of it. See Schoch, Kriminologie und Sanktionsgesetzgebung, 92 ZSTW 143,
182-83 (1980).
222. K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 16.
223. STGB § 4611. A translation reads:
In the process of determining the sentence, the court shall weigh the factors speaking for
and against the offender. In particular, it shall take into account: the offender's motives
and objectives; the attitude expressed by the offense, and the will power needed to commit it; the degree of neglect of duty; the manner of committing the offense and its effects
as far as the offender is responsible for them; the offender's prior life, his personal and
economic circumstances; and his behavior after the commission of the offense, in particular efforts to make restitution for the harm done.
224. 4 NJW 769, 770 (Fed. App. Ct. 1951); 35 MDR 769 (Fed. App. Ct. 1981) (prosecution of offenders dismissed); see E. DREHER & H. TRONDLE, STRAFGESETZBUCH UND
NEBENOESETZE § 46 n.24 (39th ed. 1980) (discussing the Judgment of the Federal Appellate
Court of May 2, 1973).
225. E. DREHER & H. TRI5NDLE, supra note 224, § 46 n,24; SCHONKE & SCHR6DER,
supra note 72, § 46 n.33; Mosl, supra note 181, at 168; H. JESCHECK, supra note 112, at 713.
226. See, e.g., SCHNKE & SCHR6DER, supra note 72, § 46, n.26.
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least negligence as to that harm. 2 7 The Federal Appellate Court, however, allows judges to consider any additional harm, even if the offender could not have foreseen the possibility of its occurrence,
"because he had culpably opened the door through which all kinds of
'2 28
harm could enter.
Third, is the offender's behavior after the commission of the offense related to his culpability in committing the act, or is it only relevant to his prospect of rehabilitation? It is illogical to say that an
offender's subsequent behavior affects his culpability in committing the
offense.2 29 Most commentators nonetheless agree that subsequent behavior can indicate the degree of hostility the offender has toward the
law, and thus may be indicative of his culpability.2 30 Consequently,
later-crimes can be taken into account in sentencing for a prior offense
even if the defendant has not been convicted of the new offense. 23 '
This practice is particularly questionable in light of the "presumption
of innocence": the state can use against the defendant offenses of
which the law presumes him innocent.2 32
Fourth, what influence, if any, should a confession or any other
form of cooperation have on the sentencing decision? The resolution of
this issue is of great practical importance, and to the German mind
provides a litmus test of the ethics of any criminal justice system. Cooperation with the police and the prosecutor says nothing about the
defendant's culpability, and it permits few inferences about his prospects for reintegration into society. The defendant may, after all, cooperate for the simple reason that he desires a more lenient sentence. The
prosecutor and the court, however, have strong interests in obtaining
confessions, and sentence discounts are a comparatively inexpensive inducement. Thus, German courts and commentators, who are proud of
the independence and dogmatic integrity of German theory, twist and
bend the concept of culpability to accommodate the interests of effective law enforcement and efficient judicial functioning.
Only one leading commentator has stated the obvious: the defendant's behavior before and during the trial has nothing to do with
his culpability. But even that writer would allow the court to consider
227. See, e.g., LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR,
TEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note 114,

mUpra note 59, § 46 n.57; E. HORN, SYS§ 46 nn.70-71; H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at

423.
228. 10 BGHSt 259, 264 (1957); see also 22 MDR 895 (Fed. App. Ct. 1968).
229. G. STRATENWERTH, supra note 155, at 32.
230. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR,supra note 59, § 46 n.93; H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at 591HERTZ, supra note 187, at 95-104.
231. 11 MDR 528 (Fed. App. Ct. 1957); 30 MDR 1036 (St. App. Ct. at Schleswig 1976).

95; T.

232. See Meyer, Diskussionsbericht, 94 ZSTW 227, 234 (1982).
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such factors as the steadfast denial of guilt in determining the offender's need for rehabilitation.2 33 All other leading writers have argued that the defendant's pretrial and trial behavior does relate, albeit
indirectly, to his culpability and his prospects for rehabilitation. Lying
or verbally abusing prosecution witnesses at trial, for example,
manifests the defendant's stubborness and his hostility toward the law,
which commentators say reflects back to his attitude when the defendant committed the offense, and thus his culpability. A confession may
be indicative of repentance and remorse and is therefore related to the
defendant's rehabilitative prospects.23 4 This argument is not persuasive, however, because it is neither logically nor psychologically convincing to infer anything about an offender's attitude toward the
criminal provision violated when he committed the act from his attitude toward the norms of the criminal process at a later point in time.
Moreover, the practice of considering the defendant's readiness to cooperate is bound to have a chilling effect on his right not to cooperate
in the state's effort to convict him. Nevertheless, lower courts frequently include the defendant's remorse among their stated sentence
reasons. 235 The court can easily establish the facts, and a clear message
is conveyed to prospective defendants. Despite the apparent influence
of cooperation, one study concluded that no clear pattern of preferential treatment of confessing defendants exists. 2 36 This finding is not inconsistent with the frequent mention of confessions in written
sentencing reasons because many judges probably rely on other considerations and use the factor as a make-weight with welcome educational
side-effects.
Most participants in the protracted debates on the subleties of general sentencing theories recognize that the legal literature on the subject
is purely academic. German judges tend simply to disregard the theorizing in their day-to-day decisions 2 37 thus creating space for the exercise of judicial discretion.
Trial courts rely on only a few factors in selecting the appropriate
sentence for an offender. According to studies of the criminal courts,
only the prior record of the accused and the monetary harm caused by
233. See E. HORN, SYSTEMATISCHER KOMMENTAR, supra note 114, § 46 nn.75 & 76.
234. See, e.g., SCH6NKE & SCHR6DER, supra note 72, § 46 nn.41 & 42; LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 nn.95 & 96; R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note 72, at 475; see
also Misl, supra note 181, at 168; 31 MDR 982 (Fed. App. Ct. 1977) (defendant's attempt to
destroy evidence indicative of personal shortcoming).
235. See E. DREHER & H. TR6NDLE, supra note 224, § 46 n.29; H. BRUNS, supra note
112, at 595-608.
236. J. SCHIEL, supra note 154, at 52, 117-18.
237. See K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 35.
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the offense 238 play an important role in decision-making. One study
found that a defendant's prior record and his "orderly life style" (which
consists of his employment history, residential stability, and marital
status) explained more than fifty percent of sentence variations, 239 but
others found that neither age, 2 ° sex,24 ' marital status, 242 nor job status2 4 3 individually had any significant effect on the sentence. The universe of possible sentencing considerations is thus reduced to three twodimensional factors: If the defendant has a prior criminal record, seriously injures his victim or damages property, 2 4 or leads a "disorderly"
life, his sentence is increased. In most cases nothing else is significant
to the court's decision, though other factors may appear in the written
judgment to bolster the sentencing decision and to make it revisionsfest
or "appeal-proof."
The isolation of the mitigating and aggravating factors that influence a court, however, does not enable one accurately to predict sentencing decisions. What is missing is the point of departure: what is
the "normal" sentence for the "normal" case of larceny, drunken driving, fraud, or assault? Unfortunately, the desert principle leaves the
problem of defining anchor sentences unresolved.24 5 Mathematical
models suggested by some German writers 246 have failed to rationalize
the sentencing process because it is impossible to draw reliable conclusions from the aggregate of largely irrational and unquantifiable factors
proposed by these authors.
As is so often the case, when reason fails tradition steps in to guide
the courts. Analysis and prediction of sentencing decisions thus must
focus on sentencing patterns of particular trial courts and increasingly
on standards enunciated by appellate courts.
Sentencing surveys show marked differences between standard
sentences in different cities and regions of Germany, but within a single
238. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 82-83 &passim.
239. Genser-Dittman, Ungeregelte LebensiVhrung a/s Strafzumessungsgrund?,7 KRiMINOLOGISCHES JOURNAL 28, 33 (1975).
240. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 158-63; K. ROLINSKI, supra note 147, at 68-73; J.
SCHIEL, supra note 154, at 45, 99-100.
241. K. ROLINSKI, supra note 147, at 55-58; J. SCHIEL, supra note 154, at 46-48, 105-06.
242. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 163-66; K. ROLINSKI, supra note 147, at 60-65.
243. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 166-71; K. ROLINSKI, supra note 147, at 45-53.
244. The amount of damage is of very little or no consequence in drunken driving cases,
H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 133, 142, but plays a significant role in cases of negligent
wounding, larceny, and criminal fraud. Id at 143-49, 152-54.
245. See supra text accompanying note 192.

246. See B. VON LINSTOw, BERECHENBARES STRAFMASSpassim
TIONALE STRAFZUMESSUNGpassim (1970).

(1974); K.

HAAG, RA-
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judicial district sentencing tends to be uniform 2. 47 A ready explanation
lies in the way German criminal judges are trained. After graduation
from law school which, as in America, gives only passing attention to
sentencing, graduates begin a four-month internship at either the district attorney's office or a criminal court. After additional internship
placements in other parts of the legal system, the young lawyer takes,
and usually passes, the German equivalent of the bar examination.
With only this much exposure to the practical problems of criminal
justice, he can become a criminal judge if his grades are better than
average. In most cases, the court first will assign him to a three-judge
panel, which deliberates and determines sentences together. The novice thus gradually learns the local sentencing tariffs from the presiding
judge, who himself learned them from an elder judge years earlier. If a
young judge sits alone and bears sole responsibility for sentencing, he
will often ask his more experienced colleagues, or in urgent cases the
prosecutor, what the "usual sentence" is in a particular case.248 Local
sentencing traditions are thus passed on from one judicial generation to
the next, a practice which can lead to strong homogeneity within courts
and to stark differences between courts.
Several methods for achieving greater sentencing equality between
courts have been proposed. Some commentators urge judges to inform
themselves about sentencing practices in other courts.2 49 Others advocate an extension of the existing practice of annual national conferences of judges on sentencing for traffic offenses to other offenses.25 °
The recommendations of such conferences, however, are regarded only
as guidelines which leave the discretion of the individual judge intact.
A third possibility would be to strengthen the appellate court's traditional role of guaranteeing the uniformity of jurisprudence in their
district.25 1
The Federal Appellate Court has long hesitated to set national
standards 25 2 but is now more willing to shoulder that responsibility.
247. H. ALBRECHT, supra note 23, at 83-93; H. SCH6CH, supra note 181, at 65; J. SCHIEL,
supra note 154, at 27-34; Trondle, Die Strafzumessung bei Trunkenheitsdeliken im Strassenverkehr, 3 BLUTALKOHOL 457, 457-59 (1966).
248. Schoene, supra note 192, at 1118.
249. H. SCHOCH, supra note 181, at 76; Schoene, supra note 192, at 1120; Trondle, supra
note 247, at 458.
250. LEIPZIGER KOMMENTAR, supra note 59, § 46 n.29; K. LACKNER, supra note 145, at 9;
Seebald, supra note 54, at 8.
251. There are twenty State Appellate Courts and one Federal Appellate Court. If a
State Appellate Court believes that the decision of another State Appellate Court or of the
Federal Appellate Court should be overruled, it must present the issue to the Federal Appellate Court, which then decides the question. GVG § 12111.
252. See H. BRUNS, supra note 112, at 504-08.
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The court is reversing more lower court judgments if the sentence is
extraordinarily severe or lenient when compared with sentences imposed by other courts in similar cases.253 The usual ground for reversal
of such judgments is an insufficient explanation for the deviation from
the sentence expected by the appellate court. 254 This court's expectation is based on its experience with similar cases decided by other trial
courts. 255 This development implies a bold step forward from the review of sentence reasons to the review of lower courts' sentences,256 but
is not without its pitfalls. The new approach toward sentence review
niust be measured not only against traditions of sentencing discretion,
but also against the principle of equality which requires that different
cases be treated differently.
V.

AN APPRAISAL

The legal provisions, statistics, and arguments that I have discussed give rise to many unresolved questions. Every sentencing system faces similar problems: should sentencing be based on retribution
or rehabilitation, who should sentence, how much discretion should the
sentencing official have, and so forth. Discussion of all of these
problems is impracticable, but I will offer a few comments based on a
very personal evaluation of the German system.
A.

Wo Should Decide?

The allocation of sentencing authority raises difficult questions,
the solution of which depends on the value a given system attaches to a
number of concerns, including: the separation of powers principle, the
presumption of innocence, and faithful adherence to a consistent sentencing theory. The trial judge - not the legislature or the prosecutor
- should remain the central figure in sentencing because it entails the
typically judicial function of applying the law to a given case. Moreover, the trial court has ready access to the facts necessary to an informed and rational sentencing decision. But despite the success of the
German experience with mixed courts of professional and lay judges,
253. R. MAURACH & H. ZIPF, supra note 72, at 482. See supra text accompanying notes
179-183.
254. See, e.g., 31 MDR 106 (Fed. App. Ct. 1976); 1977 Juristische Rundschau 159 (Fed.
App. Ct. 1976).
255. 28 BGHSt 318, 324 (1979). In this case, the Federal Appellate Court declared that
trial courts may conform to other courts' sentencing practices regarding offenses frequently
before these courts.
256. See MOsl, supra note 181, at 167.
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sentencing should not be left to lay judges sitting alone because of the
difficult legal questions that trial courts face.
Prosecutorial sentencing powers present difficult and seemingly
unsolvable problems. The prosecutor's powers to offer conditional suspension of prosecution or to initiate a penal order create efficiencies
and economies so attractive that no rational system of justice can
blithely dispense with them. Yet prosecutorial disposition of cases implicates the separation of powers principle. Even if that constitutional
question is avoided by regarding the prosecutor as a quasi-judicial
figure,2 5 7 the problem remains that those dispositions do not involve a
formal finding of guilt: the defendant in effect must waive the presumption of innocence. There is no easy escape from this dilemma. It
is sophistry to argue that the defendant voluntarily submits to the sentence. The voluntariness of his choice is illusory given that his refusal
could result in a more severe punishment. Moreover, dispositions controlled by the prosecutor clearly are criminal sanctions; they are intended to be an expression of society's disapproval of the defendant's
alleged criminal behavior. And if they are viewed as a mere warning to
forestall future criminal behavior,2 58 their validity is doubtful in a system that permits the imposition of sanctions only for past, not future
wrongs.
One possible way to reduce the open conflict between
prosecutorial sentencing and the presumption of innocence might be to
ensure the voluntariness of the defendant's decision. This could be accomplished by giving the defendant the right to judicial review of any
sentence determined by the prosecutor, while precluding the judge
from increasing the sentence. The prosecutor in routine cases would
impose sentences without a formal finding of guilt and without the initial consent of either the judge or the defendant. The defendant would
have the right to appeal this disposition. The objective of this appeal
would be either a verdict of not guilty or a reduction of the sentence.
After a hearing, the court would pronounce a guilty verdict if satisfied
that the defendant is guilty; if it determines that the sentence is too
harsh then it would shorten the sentence. But the court would lack
authority - barring extraordinary circumstances, such as a finding that
the offense had much more serious consequences than had been known
by the prosecutor - to increase the original sentence. As the defendant

257. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
258. This is the common interpretation of similar sanctions in Poland. See E. Weigend,
Die bedingte Einstellung des Strafverfahrens in Polen - zugleich ein Beitrag zur Diskussion
urn § 153 StPO, 24 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 186, 193-94 (1980).
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can appeal the sentence with no risk, his acquiescence could then be
regarded as tantamount to a voluntary admission of guilt.
The usefulness of such a procedure would hinge on the number of
appeals against the prosecutorial sentence. Absent a judicial policy of
routine reduction of sentence, the appeal rate may be lower than many
would expect because offenders soon would realize that an appeal is
worthwhile only if the prosecutor truly erred. This procedure could
help to solve some of the legal problems of diversion and plea bargaining in America - at least with respect to less serious cases - and it
could counter some of the objections against conditional dismissal.2 59
I join those who would severely restrict the powers of parole
boards and similar institutions. Absent a showing that reliable predictions of future criminal behavior can be better made at some point after
trial than at the time of sentencing, the retention of a special institution
to make this prognosis serves no purpose. Early release should turn
solely on good behavior in prison rather than a subjective decision
whether the offender has been rehabilitated. Parole boards and correctional courts, if they are to exist, should thus be responsible only for
monitoring good time credits, and possibly correctional measures affecting prisoners. Post-release services, of course, should continue.
B.

One Hearing or Two?

The Anglo-American system of separate guilt-finding and sentencing proceedings seems to me clearly preferable to the German system
of integrated trials.2 6 ° A bifurcated sentencing hearing may prevent the
decision of guilt from being influenced by a negative stereotype of a
defendant predisposed to crime. Even if, as in a system based on the
desert principle, the sentence is largely determined by the characteristics of the offense, so that an extensive investigation of the offender's
personality is not necessary, a separate hearing allows the court and the
parties to concentrate on sentencing options and on aggravating and
mitigating factors.
C. Presumptive Sentences
Equality in sentencing is a realizable goal, but it cannot be
achieved by the elimination of all sentencing flexibility as in a "flat"
sentencing statute. Prefabricated sentencing scales must fail because no
259. See supra text accompanying notes 104-106. See also Silving, supra note 24, at
249-50.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 141-144.
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legislature can foresee all possible factors that affect the gravity of an
offense; they produce procrustean, not equal justice.
The presumptive sentence approach, advocated by some American
commentators,2 6' seems a better approach to achieving sentencing
equality. A presumptive sentencing statute should consist of specific
penalties (e.g., one year imprisonment) for narrowly described offenses
(e.g., forgery of an official document, burglary of a home). In addition,
there should be a range in mitigation for cases of lesser seriousness, and
a range in aggravation for more serious cases. The sentencing court
would have discretion to choose any sentence within the two ranges,
but its discretion should be guided further by lists of mitigating and
aggravating factors. These factors should be specific to each group of
offenses even though some of them, such as excessive amount of damage and unnecessary use of violence, would recur with some frequency.
The list of factors should be neither compelling nor exhaustive. The
court would remain free to give other reasons for choosing a sentence
below or above that presumptively appropriate, or to stick with the
standard penalty even though the case contains aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Under a presumptive sentence approach, the court would carry the
burden to justify its decision, and the sentence would be subject to strict
review by an appellate court upon appeal by either party. Sentence
reasons would relate to the offense rather than to the offender's general
character or to his rehabilitative needs. As such facts easily can be
spelled out in the written judgment, little would be left for consideration of the personal impression the offender made on the court, or for
other inscrutable factors. The sentencing decision therefore would be
subject in its entirety to appellate review. The higher court could assess
both the correctness of the sentencing reasons cited, and the weight
given to each of them, especially when the sentence imposed differs
from the presumptive sentence. Sentencing courts would thus be under
tight control. They would maintain the right to tailor the sanction to
the circumstances of each case, but they would have to do so in an open
and rationally articulated process.
Whether the legislature, a judicial council, or a sentencing commission develops the presumptive standards is not a question of principle but of political convenience. In a system like the German, in which
261. See R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS:

SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT

50-52 (1979); Tonry & Morris, Sentencing Reform in America, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS 443-44 (P. Glazebrook ed. 1978);
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN

PUNISHMENT 19-29 (1976); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 153, at 98-101 (1976).
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judgments concerning value preferences are normally left to the legislature, presumptive sentences should be molded in statutory form. In
America, however, where public pressure makes the legislature an unlikely forum of sensible liberal reform, a sentencing commission might
be the better choice.2 62 Sentencing scales in those American states that
enacted presumptive sentencing laws demonstrate that legislatures are
prone to give in to popular demands for harsher punishment without
seriously considering the consequences upon the individual offender
and upon the justice system as a whole.2 63
D.

"Honest" Sentencing

The previous subsection assumes that equal sentences are rational
and just sentences, and that a maximum of equality is therefore to be
desired. Not everyone would agree with that proposition. Hassemer
and other commentators recently suggested an alternative concept of
rationality in sentencing. 26 Rational sentencing, argues Hassemer, is
most of all honest sentencing. He would require the sentencing judge
to discuss his subjective reasons for imposing a sentence with the defendant and to admit frankly his doubt about the feasibility of both
finding a sentence proportionate to the offender's culpability and promoting the offender's and the general public's welfare. The defendant
should have an extensive right to be heard, and his views should be
discussed both in open court and in the written judgment. The result of
such a process, according to Hassemer, might not be a sentence of strict
equality, but one that is the result of a free and rational discourse.
An honest sentencing approach would be inimical to detailed
prestructuring by guidelines as well as to close appellate review. The
appellate court would have to accept the trial court's sentence if based
on plausible arguments and on acceptable preferences of the individual
sentencing judge. Hassemer's concept has initial appeal, especially in
view of the habit of many trial courts to repeat "safe" but empty formulae instead of spelling out the genuine reasons for the sentences they
pronounce. But Hassemer's idea of rationality is deficient because it
places form above substance: the defendant's participation in the determination of his fate is purely formal. Because he has nothing but
262. See Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV.

315passim (1979) (urging the creation of politically insulated independent commissions with
rulemaking authority, subject to statutory criteria and limits); Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing." The Model SentencingAnd CorrectionsAct, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOrY 1550 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing].
263. See Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing, supra note 262, at 1552 & 1552 n.8.
264. See Hassemer, supra note 54, at 89-98; Mosl, supra note 181, at 165; see also
Damaska, supra note 132,passim.
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words to offer, his power to influence the outcome remains nil. Although the offender benefits by learning the court's true motives, he
pays a heavy price: those motives are essentially impervious to review.
Given the choice between the two models of rationality - one that
calls for a court to articulate its subjective reasons or one that requires
it to adhere to the objective standards promulgated by the legislature I would opt for the traditional concept: He who sentences applies the
law, no more and no less. Although sentencing may involve value
judgements and other imponderables more difficult than the application of a tax statute, the mechanism should be the same. The decisionmaker must attempt to determine, by employing the usual methods of
statutory interpretation, the disposition that best conforms to the applicable law and rules, and he must explain the decision against the background of strictly formulated legislative standards. A higher tribunal
which authoritatively construes and interprets the law should review
the sentence and the reasons for it, thus gradually making sentencing
decisions more equal and more foreseeable.
E. Punishment's Purpose
My final remarks concern the purposes of punishment, and are
determined by my personal creed: I believe that a rational system of
punishment should be based on the principles of desert and retribution.
I do so not out of a belief in metaphysical justice, but because I think
that desert, correctly understood, restricts punishment to the extent
most socially tolerable. A state should not inflict more harm on its citizens than is absolutely necessary. The amount of punishment should
be determined by what is needed to restore the public peace and to
calm the waves tossed up by the offender's act. An offender must pay
the price for what he has done. He must suffer to settle the disturbance
his offense has created. This position permits reductions in punishment
for defendants who acted in situations of conflict, or under stress. But
it forbids extension of a sentence based on consideration of the dangerousness of the offender, his rehabilitative needs, or society's interest in
imposing exemplary punishment to deter others. I would go even further by denying the wisdom and fairness of longer sentences for repeat
offenders; in a sentencing system strictly based on desert, it is difficult
265
to find a rational justification for that practice.
265. A desert-oriented theory does not permit sentencing decisions to rest on predictions
of future criminality. Any reliance on an offender's prior criminal record can only rest on
prediction rather than desert. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 153, at 466 (1978) (consideration of prior convictions reflect a concern to protect society by retarding future conduct);
Schiller, Book Review, 67 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 357-58 (1978) (criticizing theory
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The German penal system is a far-from-perfect embodiment of the
desert principle: It contains special recidivist statutes, allows rehabilitative and general deterrence considerations to influence the decision,
and permits the imposition of additional sanctions for dangerous of-

fenders. Although theorists may be inclined to criticize the legislature
for being inconsistent, only academics enjoy the privilege of not being
political animals and of carrying a banner of "invariable truth" in the
face of practical problems and political pressures. Sentencing will remain a field of compromise; what we must work for is a better

compromise.
of Andrew von Hirsch). But see A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 153, at 132-40 (recidivism is an
appropriate consideration in a system based on desert); von Hirsch, DesertandPrevious Conviction, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591 (1981). von Hirsch argues that: "A repetition of the offense
following [an earlier] conviction may be regarded as more culpable, since he persisted in the
behavior after having been forcefully censured for it through his prior punishment." A. VON
HIRSCH, supra note 153, at 85.

